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Abstract
The problem of compliance with treaty obligations has been an area of active study in 
international environmental law because of its importance to the effectiveness of environmental 
treaties.  This paper examines the problem of enforcement as an important and distinct 
component of compliance.  First, the paper describes the general nature of the problem and the 
theoretical approaches that have been put forward as alternatives.  Second, the paper then locates 
a key difficulty of environmental treaty enforcement in its public good characteristics.  The paper 
specifically examines the “public good” functions of enforcement as well as the difficulties of 
generating this “good.” The paper concludes by suggesting three general approaches to 
overcoming these difficulties and provides a critique of the recently adopted non-compliance 
mechanism of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention.
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International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in 
International Environmental Agreements
by Tseming Yang*
Introduction
The problem of treaty enforcement is as old as the existence of international law itself.1
For multilateral environmental agreements, however, the need to police treaty commitments has 
gained greater attention because of the increased importance of the subject matter:  pressing 
global environmental problems as varied as ozone depletion, global climate change, loss of 
biodiversity, and the international trade in hazardous wastes.  
Unfortunately, the problem has remained generally intractable.  Some specialized treaty 
systems, such as the World Trade Organization, have been able to create apparently effective 
enforcement mechanisms.  But no broad solution to the enforcement problem, especially not one 
readily applicable to multilateral environmental agreements, has presented itself.  The 
contemporary reality remains that the vast majority of treaty violations go unanswered by the 
international community. 
In the environmental field, great attention has been given to the proactive management of 
treaty compliance and the use of non-coercive mechanisms.2  The non-compliance process of the 
Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substances and the citizen submissions process of the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation are all manifestations of such efforts.  
1
  Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.  I am grateful to Richard Brooks, Sanford Gaines, Shi-ling Hsu, Gregory 
Johnson, Peter Spiro, Pamela Stephens, and Oran Young and the participants of colloquia at Hofstra University Law 
School and the University Pittsburgh Law School for valuable comments on earlier drafts and presentations of this 
manuscript.  Research assistance was provided by Melissa Armbrister, John Cooke, Jennifer DeLyon, Valerie 
Diden, David Pocius, Jeremy Hojnicki, and Andrea Silberman. 
2
  For a documentary study of the enforcement problem in international law, see BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW – A WAY TO WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1983) (2 volumes).  
For a survey of sanction devices of the past, see PAYSON S. WILD, JR.,  SANCTIONS AND TREATY ENFORCEMENT 83-
195 (1934)(invocation of heavenly punishment, use of hostages, self-help, and third-party guarantees).  See also
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SANCTIONS: THE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND 
THEIR APPLICATION (2d ed. 1935).
3 See, e.g., PETER M. HAAS, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AND MARC A. LEVY, EDS., INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: 
SOURCES FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 24 (1993); ORAN R. YOUNG, 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994); ABRAM CHAYES 
AND ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:  COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS (1996); JAMES CAMERON, JACOB WERKSMAN & PETER RODERICK, EDS., IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1996); EDITH BROWN WEISS AND HAROLD K. JACOBSON, EDS., 
ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (1998); 
DAVID G. VICTOR, KAL RAUSTIALA, AND EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1998); ORAN R. YOUNG, ED., THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL 
MECHANISMS (1999).
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The long-term success of such approaches still remains to be seen.4  Two of the most 
prominent proponents, however, Antonia Handler Chayes and the late Abram Chayes, went as 
far as to say that “[t]he effort to devise and incorporate [deterrent] sanctions in treaties is largely 
a waste of time.”5  Given the Chayes’ well-known past work and its influence in the area of 
“compliance management,” such a statement cannot be taken lightly.  But what about the 
implications for the effectiveness of environmental treaties and the institutional nature of 
enforcement?
This article focuses on these issues through the lens of two general questions.  First, what 
is the function of treaty enforcement and institutional deterrent sanctions?  Second, what are the 
obstacles to the effective deployment of institutional deterrent sanctions in response to 
noncompliance events?  I elaborate on the instrumental purposes of enforcement as well as its 
independent normative function.  Much of the analysis follows the recent stream of works that 
combines both international law and international relations theory.   Their tools offer a rich 
understanding of the conduct of states and the functioning of international legal regimes.6
Part I of the article first provides a brief overview of the problem of treaty enforcement, 
including traditional sanctions options and alternative approaches: unilateral sanctions, 
compliance management, and transformation of identity and interests.  Part II and III explore the 
structural complexities of environmental treaty enforcement.  I examine its public good attributes 
in Part II.  Part III then considers the associated problems of generating enforcement actions.  
They can be found primarily in the obstacles to collective action, the distinct nature of deterrent 
sanctions as ex post rather than ex ante compliance measures, and the frailty of the normative 
foundations of treaties.
Part IV considers the implications for improving the effectiveness of enforcement 
mechanisms and possible avenues for creating the “enforcement good.”  Particular options 
include the alteration of incentives to engage in enforcement as well as changes in its valuation.  
Less obvious choices are the promotion of entrepreneurial enforcement as well as improved 
design of treaty regimes.  The final part critiques the recently adopted non-compliance 
mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
There is no question that institutional deterrent sanctions are difficult to deploy 
appropriately and effectively.  Notwithstanding the prevailing contemporary practice and 
thinking, however, they are likely to remain important tools for improving the effectiveness of 
environmental agreements.
I.  A Brief Overview of the Problem of Treaty Enforcement
The usage of the term “enforcement” in the international law literature has not been 
4
  For one examination of the effectiveness of the citizen submission process, see Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness 
of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement's Citizen Submission Process: A Case Study of the Metales y 
Derivados Matter, 76 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 443 (2005)
5 ABRAM CHAYES AND ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note __, at 2.  See also LOUIS 
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47, 49 (2d ed. 1979).
6
  For an overview of modern international relations theory, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations 
Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
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consistent.  It has been used to describe efforts to expose and document failures of compliance,7
various bilateral interactions designed to promote compliance,8 private boycotts by non-
governmental organizations,9 and “managerial,” non-punitive efforts designed to persuade and 
help noncomplying states come back into compliance.10  The version I focus on here is the most 
common understanding and most closely related to its use in national legal systems:  the use of 
institutionally authorized deterrent sanctions to effect compliance with the law.11
A.  The Difficulty of Coercing States: Traditional Sanctions Options
The root cause of the enforcement problem is the anarchic state of the international 
system.12  A popular misconception that arises is that existing sanctions mechanisms are weak, 
non-existent, or otherwise ineffective.13  The perceived solution is to create new or stronger 
sanctions.  
The popular belief misunderstands the condition of anarchy.  There are in fact a number 
of options endorsed by international law for the imposition of sanctions:  countermeasures, 
membership sanctions, and treaty-based mechanisms.  They have varying levels of coercive 
effect. 
1.  Countermeasures: Retorsion, Reciprocal Action, and Reprisals 
Countermeasures are self-help acts that customary international law permits states to take 
in response to a wrongful act.14  They are no different in nature from self-help remedies that 
national legal systems provide under certain conditions to victims of legal wrongs.  The right of 
self-defense is one example.  Countermeasures are commonly classified into three groups: 
retorsions, reciprocal actions, and reprisals.15
7 See Kal Raustiala, International “Enforcement of Enforcement” under the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT. L. 721, 760 (1996);  Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement, 
and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements – Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's 
Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37.
8 See Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 110, 117-118 (1995). 
9 See David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the 
Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 559-563 (1998).
10 See Gunther Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations, 5 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 29 (1997) (“fine-tuning” enforcement).  For an even broader usage of the term, see Alfred P. 
Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of International Law, 34 HARV. INT. L. J. 149-161 (1993).
11 See W. Michael Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT. L. 1, 6 (1969). 
12 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Classics 1987), chap. 13; HEADLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY.
13 See, e.g., Stephen M. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions to Improve Global Environmental 
Relations, Agreement, and Treaty Enforcement, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771, 779 (1995); Andrew 
Watson Samaan, Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 261, 
273 (1993).  See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE 525-534 (rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson, 6th ed. 1985).   
14
  Because they are usually imposed unilaterally, countermeasures can be considered a subset of unilateral 
sanctions.  See infra section II(A).
15 See generally ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES
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Retorsions are unfriendly, but lawful acts that would be permitted even absent a treaty 
breach.16  In response to a state’s violation of its obligations under an international trade 
agreement, for example, the injured parties could suspend unrelated discretionary economic 
aid.17  Reciprocal actions consist, as their name suggests, of acts of reciprocal noncompliance - a 
reciprocal breach of the treaty obligation.18  For example, a state that imposes import tariffs on 
goods in violation of its obligations under an international free trade agreement may face the 
reciprocal suspension of tariff concessions by other treaty parties.
Finally, reprisals (also termed retaliation) are more serious responses to noncompliance.  
Such acts are ordinarily not permitted under international law, but they become lawful by virtue 
of the initial treaty breach.  To qualify as reprisals, such acts must be “necessary to terminate the 
violation[, to] prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation.”  They must also not be “out 
of proportion to the violation and the injury suffered.”19  Internationally, states have resorted to 
the imposition of economic sanctions or the freezing of assets as forms of reprisals.20
In multilateral settings, retorsion and reciprocal action remedies are usually weak forms 
of sanctions.  Since retorsions are legal to use in all settings, their harmful effects are unlikely to 
be great.  Reciprocal actions are usually ineffective when some common good is advanced by 
treaty compliance.  With respect to environmental treaties, reciprocal noncompliance exacerbates 
the initial treaty breach by leading to more environmental harm.  For human rights obligations, 
reciprocal violations are unthinkable.
Reprisals, in contrast, can have greater coerciveness.  As a practical matter, however, 
they are available and can be used effectively only by powerful nations because of potential 
retaliation by the target state.  
2.  Membership Sanctions
Membership sanctions refer to the suspension of membership privileges as a response to 
noncompliance.  Examples would be the right to vote and to participate in governance or the 
termination of membership.21
When membership comes with valuable benefits, such sanctions can be a credible 
deterrent.  For example, expulsion from the World Trade Organization would lead to the loss of 
valuable trade privileges and other preferential economic treatment. 
With respect to many multilateral treaties, including environmental agreements, however, 
(1984).
16 See ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra note , at 5.  Retorsions exclude reciprocal acts.
17 See, e.g., Rest. (Third) For. Relat. sec. 905, comment a. 
18
  They may be accomplished through suspension or termination of the treaty in whole or in part.  See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60.  See also MOHAMMED M. GOMAA, SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF 
TREATIES ON GROUNDS OF BREACH (1996); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist 
International Relations Theory: the Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State 
Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
19 See Rest. (Third) For. Relat. sec. 905(1).  See also Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Reports (1997) at para. 82-87. 
20 See Rest. (Third) For. Relat. sec. 905, comment b. 
21 See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT. L. 1, 11 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking 
WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT. L.792, 827 (2001).
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membership termination is an ineffective sanction .  Such treaties call on states to take on 
affirmative, and sometimes onerous obligations, ranging from reducing pollution to protecting 
human rights.  Expulsion releases the target country from the treaty’s burdens and harms the 
treaty system further by exacerbating the initial breach.22
3. Treaty-based Mechanisms:  Bilateral and Collective Sanctions
Treaty-based mechanisms include both bilateral, state-to-state mechanisms and collective 
sanctioning mechanisms.  As with countermeasures, the coerciveness of treaty-based 
mechanisms varies greatly.
Bilateral enforcement mechanism consists largely of state-to-state dispute settlement.23
The best known of such processes, that of the GATT/WTO, allows for the imposition of trade 
sanctions upon a finding of noncompliance.24  Sanctions must be formally approved before they 
can be imposed.25
Most older environmental treaties lack dispute settlement provisions.26 In contemporary 
treaty-making practice, however, bilateral dispute settlement provisions are now wide-spread.   
Nevertheless, they usually lack explicit authority for the imposition of binding consequences.27
Reliance is placed instead on mediation, conciliation, and non-binding arbitration.28
Anecdotal evidence suggests that bilateral mechanisms of many treaties, especially in 
multilateral environmental agreements, have generally remained unutilized.29  For example, 
within the 30 year history of the Convention to regulate International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)30 there have been a number of significant instances of
 noncompliance with CITES norms.31  However, no party has ever pursued a dispute through 
22
  Voluntary withdrawal can be a converse sanction if the institution is heavily dependent on the support of one or a 
few individual states.  See generally CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY,  supra note , at 29-108. 
23
  For a discussion of supranational adjudication , which resembles bilateral mechanisms because it utilizes an 
arbitral/judicial format, see Laurence Helfer and Anne Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997). See also section ___ infra.
24 See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2:  Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); North American Free Trade 
Agreement, art. 2019.  The WTO refers to the suspension of concessions or other obligations rather than explicit 
“trade sanctions.”  See also North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, arts. 34-36 & annexes 34, 
36A & 36B.
25
  The mechanism has been actively used for over 250 trade cases since its re-inception in 1995.  See World Trade 
Organization, Status in Brief of the Disputes, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm>, 
visited Feb. 20, 2003.
26 See Birnie & Boyle, supra note ___, at 180; General Accounting Office, International Environment: Literature on 
the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, May 1999, GAO/RCED-99-148, at 22-23.
27 See, e.g, DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL 
WARMING 64 (2001). 
28
  Sanctions remain available through the use of countermeasures, membership sanctions, and reprisals.
29
  David Victor asserts that dispute settlement provisions in multilateral environmental agreements have never been 
formally invoked.  See David Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note , at 64.
30
  Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975)
31 See ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES:  THE CITES TREATY AND 
COMPLIANCE ( 2002).
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formal adjudicative processes as provided for under article 18(b) of the agreement.32
Multilateral mechanisms are even rarer than bilateral mechanisms.  The most prominent 
one, with the most coercive sanctioning powers at its disposal, can be found in the United 
Nations Security Council.33  Because of the veto power of each of the five permanent Security 
Council members, any of them can block the exercise of enforcement powers.34  Not 
surprisingly, the overall number of Security Council interventions has remained small.  From its 
inception to 1990, it authorized the use of military force only once (in the Korean war in the 
1950s) and economic sanctions twice (Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977).35  Since 
1990, however, the Council’s Chapter VII powers have been used more frequently.  Economic 
sanctions and military force have been authorized approximately a little more than a dozen 
times.36
* * * * *
Even if many of the difficulties of enforcement are attributable to the weak and 
ineffectual nature of most sanctions options, that is not the most important problem of 
enforcement.  Existing options can have strongly coercive effects.  Yet, their utilization in 
response to noncompliance events is lackluster.37
Anarchy thus does not mean “that international law has no sanctions” at its disposal.  
Rather, it is that the available “sanctions [are] precarious in their operation”38 because there is no 
transnational authority to coordinate and direct them.39
B.  Alternatives to Institutional Deterrent Sanctions
The intractability of the problem has led to the pursuit of alternative approaches.  The 
three of greatest prominence are: unilateral measures, compliance management, and 
32
    Violations have always been settled either informally, under article 18(a), or through actions and resolutions by 
the Conference of the Parties, the governing body of CITES.  See WILLEM WIJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION OF 
CITES: A REFERENCE TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FLORA 
AND FAUNA 375 (1998), available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/publications.shtml>.
33
  Charter of the United Nations, arts. 39-51, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).  The Security Council may have additional 
authority under article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter to enforce judgments by the International Court of Justice.  See, 
e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT. L. 1, 17-24 
(1960); W.M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS 
AND AWARDS 704-713 (1971).  However, this power has never been used by the Council.  See BARRY E. CARTER & 
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305-307 (3rd ed. 1999).
34
  U.N. Charter, art. 27.
35 See CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note , at 34-67; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 651, 662 (2d ed. 2000).
36 DAVID CARTRIGHT AND GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S
(2002) at 1-2. 
37 See, e.g., Steiner & Alston, supra note , at 633-634 (discussing failures of Security Council to act decisively 
against genocide in Rwanda).
38
  Brierly, supra note , at 98-99.  See generally infra ____.
39 See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 7-8 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955);  J.L. 
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 42- 50 (1955).
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transformational processes.40  Each is a response based on its view of why states comply with 
international law.  Because some of their theoretical foundations have been articulated well 
within the international relations field, I make reference to that literature here.
1.  Unilateral Sanctions 
Unilateral sanctions are primarily tools of self-help.  Their appeal derives from their 
ability to deploy measures with much stronger coercive effects, such as brute military force or 
trade sanctions.41  According to realist theories of the international system,42 such approaches are 
necessary because states comply with international legal obligations only when their interests 
happen to coincide with legal norms or because of coercion by a superior power.43
As prime evidence of their efficacy, supporters of unilateral approaches usually point to 
the apparent success of the U.S.’s use of unilateral sanctions, especially trade sanctions.44  Yet, 
such effectiveness assertions have not gone unchallenged.45
The case of international whaling is instructive.  In 1986, the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) imposed a moratorium on commercial whaling, which continues until the 
present.46  Since the IWC has no enforcement powers on its own, it relies on individual nations 
to implement and enforce that moratorium.
With respect to states who have ignored the moratorium, the U.S. has deployed unilateral 
trade sanctions authorized under the Pelly Amendment.  Steve Charnovitz has characterized such 
activities as “reasonably effective” in curtailing whaling.47  Yet, others such as Dean Wilkinson, 
have vigorously disputed that assertion.48  Wilkinson has suggested that the politics of imposing 
trade sanctions, especially when the targets have been allies of the U.S., has significantly 
undermined a systematic and effective use of trade sanctions.  In fact, the lack of “effectiveness” 
of the Pelly Amendment sanctions is most obvious with respect to the whaling activities of 
40
  The theoretical overviews given here are intended to be sketches only.  For another overview, see Kenneth W. 
Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal 
Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999).
41
  They are authorized by customary international law if they meet the criteria for permissible countermeasures
42 HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE, rev. by Kenneth W. 
Thompson (6th ed. 1985); Nicolo Macchiavelli, THE PRINCE. 
43 See, e.g.,  Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, supra note .
44 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited 
Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL. INTL. BUS. 263 (1992).
45 See, e.g., Daniel Drezner, supra note , at 98 (“multilateral sanctions that have the support of an international 
organization are significantly more effective than unilateral efforts”).
46 See David Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: 
the Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 156 (1995).
47 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: an Analysis of the Pelly Amendment 
on Foreign Environmental Practice, 9 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 751, 806 (1994). 
48
  Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling Agreements, 17 Denv. J. of 
Int. Law and Policy 271, 281-291 (1989) (detailing the history and success of the U.S. use of trade sanctions with 
regard to whaling).  See also CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note  at 94-96; Gregory Rose and George 
Paleokrassis, Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: A Case Study of the International Whaling 
Commission, in CAMERON, ET AL., IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note , at 169-170.
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Norway and Japan.  To this day, both continue to engage in commercial whaling activities, with 
Japan thinly disguising it and euphemistically calling it scientific research whaling.49
There are two additional problems.  First, efforts to impose unilateral sanctions may 
entail significant costs:  loss of economic opportunities (in the case of trade sanctions), financial 
expenditures and the loss of lives if military interventions occur, or simply the general loss of 
good-will by the target and third-party states.  It can also trigger retaliation by the target against 
the enforcer, including the possibility of “a long echo of alternating retaliations,”50 and other 
adverse collateral consequences.51  Since such costs can be enormous, unilateral sanctions are 
available as a practical matter only to the most powerful nations.52
Second, unilateral sanctions are oftentimes seen as illegitimate.  There is no authoritative 
or neutral determination of the illegality of the initial act of breach or the fairness of the 
response.  Sanctions legitimacy is thus largely a function of whether one is at the giving or 
receiving end of such sanctions.  One state’s unilateral retaliatory action may look to the targeted 
country as unlawful aggression or other breach of international law.  Even worse, since only the 
strong can engage in such forms of coercion, such responses are subject to the “vicissitudes of 
the distribution of power between the violator of the law and the victim of the violation.”53
2.  Compliance Management
Compliance management, a term coined by the writings of Abram and Antonia Handler 
Chayes,54 describes the pro-active engagement of states and international institutions in ensuring 
compliance with treaty obligations.  State compliance behavior is to be actively affected and 
shaped through continuous oversight, official prodding and brow-beating, and the providing of 
institutional help and positive incentives for those at risk of breach.  It de-emphasizes deterrence 
and arguably finds punitive sanctions unhelpful .55
Compliance management is part of the institutionalist branch of international relations, 
frequently referred to as regime theory.56  While institutionalism accepts that states are rational 
actors driven by self-interest, it also takes the ability of international institution to independently 
49 See Andrew C. Revkin, Japan Says It Will Double Its Annual Whale Harvest in Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
2002, at A14; Walter Gibbs, World Briefing Europe: Norway: Whalers Allowed A Bigger Catch , N.Y. Times, Feb. 
16, 2002, at A10.
50 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 37, 183 (1984).
51 See, e.g., MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 26-27, 100-102, 
106-109 (1987). 
52 See generally CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, suupra note , at 88-111.
53 MORGENTHAU, POWER AMONG NATIONS, supra note ___, at 312 (1985).  See also Thucydides, supra note ___ 
(“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”).
54 CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note , at 22.
55 See CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note , at __.
56 See, e.g., ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (1984); Peter M Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, Improving the Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Institutions, in HAAS, ET AL., INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH, supra note , at  399-408.  
Stephen D. Krasner, ed., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983).
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shape and influence state behavior much more seriously.57
The Chayes’ managerialism emphasizes the power of legal norms.  They stress that in 
addition to material incentives and efficiency considerations,58 compliance with treaty norms 
occurs in large part because “people – whether as a result of socialization or otherwise – accept 
that they are obligated to obey the law.”59  To promote compliance then, managerialism seeks 
not only to adjust the incentives for compliance, for instance by providing economic or technical 
aid that can make it easier to fulfill treaty obligations, but also engages the sense of obligation to 
obey international legal norms.  This is accomplished through mechanisms that allow for 
persuasive discourse about treaty obligations and potential breaches.60  It also relies on the use of 
social and diplomatic pressure to remedy such breaches.61
A number of empirical studies have found compliance management to contribute 
significantly to treaty effectiveness.62  In fact, the Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Depleting 
Substances, which embodies much of the managerial model, is considered to be one of the most 
successful multilateral environmental treaties to-date.63  It has been widely credited with 
dramatically reducing the production and consumption of chemicals that destroy stratospheric 
ozone layer, which protects humans and the ecological system from the harmful effects of 
ultraviolet radiation.64
But there has also been significant criticism.65  George Downs has argued that high levels 
of compliance attributed to managerial mechanisms are primarily due to pre-existing high levels 
57 See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS THEORY 2 (1989).  See also COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth Oye ed. 1986); Kenneth Abbott, 
Modern International Relations Theory, supra.
58
  Compliance may be efficient because decisions “are not free goods[, and g]overnmental resources for policy 
analysis and decision making are costly and in short supply.” CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note ___, 4-
7.  Compliance may also be in the interest of a state because ratification and acceptance of treaty obligations  
presumably show that treaty membership benefits the parties.  Id.
59 CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note , at 8. 
60
  The Chayes summarize their managerialist prescriptions as 1) ensuring transparency, 2) providing for dispute 
settlement, 3) capacity building, and 4) promoting the use of persuasion.   
61 CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note , at 22-26.  The detriment can be as amorphous as loss of trust 
regarding compliance with other agreements, loss of status and reputation, shunning, and public shaming or as 
concrete as the loss of unrelated benefits, such as international development aid or technical cooperation.  For the 
influence of non-legal sanctions on conduct, see ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note ; David Charny, 
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 392-394 (1990).
62 See, e.g., HAAS, ET AL., INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH supra note ; WEISS AND JACOBSON, ENGAGING 
COUNTRIES, supra note ; YOUNG, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, supra note ; 
Jonas Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 INT. ORG. 609 
(2002).
63 See, e.g., Benedick, supra note __; Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note __, at x-xi; Kal 
Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 
319-320 (2000); Glenn Wiser, supra note , at 28 (“facilitation approach is generally viewed as a success”).  See 
generally O. Yoshida, Soft Enforcement of Treaties, supra note .
64 See, e.g., Benedick, supra note __.
65 See David Victor, The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol’s Noncompliance Procedure, in 
VICTOR, ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, 
supra note , at 137.
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of cooperation among the treaty parties.66  Compliance is thus not the result of managerial 
efforts, but rather due to an independent propensity of the parties to comply.  States are only 
doing what they would have done anyway.
There are two further specific concerns about the aversion to punitive sanctions and the 
possible long-term effects.67  First, noncompliance has no significant adverse consequences.  
Instead, it triggers positive assistance for the violator.  Since compliance with most 
environmental agreements requires expenditure of resources and foregoing economic 
opportunities, a rationally self-interested actors would ordinarily not be expected to comply other 
than when convenient.  In fact, when large stakes are at issue, including national security 
concerns, significant economic issues, or other important national interests, can the weak 
coercive force of public shame, loss of reputation, or a sense of moral duty to obey international 
law be expected to counter the likelihood of breach.68  Is it reasonable to expect much more than 
the appearance of a desire to comply? 
Second, aversion to punitive sanctions raises questions about the credibility of the treaty 
obligations and the parties’ commitment to them.  The risk is that failure to sanction can be 
interpreted as indifference to noncompliance.  If behavior and responses toward norm violators is 
largely indistinguishable from behavior toward norm adherents, do the treaty’s norms and 
obligations really mean what they say?  Are binding obligations no different from hortatory and 
aspirational commitments?  
A closer examination of the Montreal Protocol’s treatment of Russian noncompliance 
illustrates some of these concerns.69  The Noncompliance Procedure has been the primary tool 
for monitoring the ozone depleting substances (ODS) phase-out obligations.  It is based on the 
premise that repeated interactions and iterative discourse can engage the violator in a cooperative 
enterprise to end noncompliance. 
Under the process, the Protocol’s Implementation Committee (IC) investigates 
allegations of noncompliance and makes recommendations for resolution to the Protocol’s 
member states.  The parties have supplied an indicative list of remedies, which include positive 
assistance to the violator, cautionary messages, and the suspension of specific membership rights 
and privileges.70  The IC’s usual response has been to recommend economic aid, technical 
assistance, or other helpful measures to bring the violator back into compliance.71  It has never 
66
  Downs et al., Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?, supra note .
67 See, e.g., Downs et al., The Transformational Model of International Regime Design, supra note , at 499-500.
68 See, e.g., CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note  at 142; Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-based Theory of 
International Law, supra note .
69
  Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, art. 8, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987); OZONE SECRETARIAT - UNITED 
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE 
OZONE LAYER 161–164, 263-267 (5th ed. 2000), available at <http://www.unep.ch/ozone/publications.shtml>.  See 
also O. Yoshida, Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol’s Noncompliance Procedure and the 
Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 95 (1999).
70
  Indicative List of Measures That Might be Taken by a Meeting of the Parties in respect of Noncompliance with 
the Protocol, Annex V of the Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties, OZONE SECRETARIAT - UNITED NATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE 
LAYER [OZONE SECRETARIAT HANDBOOK], supra note , at 265.  
71
  Noncompliance Procedure (1998), Annex II of the Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Parties, OZONE 
SECRETARIAT HANDBOOK, supra note , at 267 (“measures to assist the Parties’ compliance”); Report of the 
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recommended formal deterrent sanctions.  The IC also continues to monitor the violator’s 
compliance progress through periodic reporting requirements and meetings.  
In 1995, the Russian Federation notified the Montreal Protocol parties that it would 
imminently (as of January 1, 1996) be in noncompliance with its production phase-out 
obligations.72  In response, the parties recommended international assistance to address this 
problem and “imposed” additional information reporting requirements.73
In 1997, the IC found that Russia not only remained in noncompliance but had also 
engaged in prohibited trade of ODS.74  Noncompliance continued in 1998.  While the Protocol 
parties held up the threat of more coercive sanctions, such as suspension of treaty privileges,75
they also decided that Russia “should continue to be treated in the same manner as a Party in 
good standing.”76  Russia did come into compliance at the end of 2000, when it finally closed all 
CFC production facilities.77
The entire process took more than 5 years from Russia’s initial announcement.  During 
that time, monitoring activities,  financial assistance, prodding, and numerous meetings 
occurred.78  Sanctions were never imposed.  
If the 5-year delay does not seem excessive, consider that Russia originally had asked for 
a 5-year grace-period.79  Worse yet, in 2000, Russia actually increased production in order to 
Thirteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.13/10 Para. 102 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at <http://www.unep.org/ozone/mop/13mop/13mop-
10.e.pdf> (“that the role of the Implementation Committee [is] to help Parties facing difficulties in compliance by 
identifying the additional efforts needed and helping in the provision of financial assistance.”).
72 See Dec. VII/18, para. 1, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (1995).  See also Yoshida, supra
note , at 135.
73
   [MoP decision VII/18]
74
  Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Noncompliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the 
Work of its Seventeenth Meeting, U.N. Environment Programme, paras 25, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/17/3 (1997).  See also Yoshida, supra note , at 138-139.
75 Id.
76
  Dec. X/26, para. 3, Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro10/9 (1998).
77
  Report of the Secretariat on Information Provided by the Parties in Accordance with Article 7 of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.13/3 para. ___ (Oct. ___, 2001), available at 
.http://www.unep.org/ozone/mop/13mop/13mop-3.e.pdf>. 
78 See Dec. XIV/35, Compliance with the Montreal Protocol by the Russian Federation, Report of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment 
Programme, UNEP/OzL.Pro.14/9 (2002), available at <http://www.unep.ch/ozone/mop/14mop/14mop-9.e.pdf>.
79
  Statement by countries with economies in transition that are Parties to the Montreal Protocol – Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine – or intend to become Parties to the Protocol – Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyztan – at the 
twelfth meeting of the Open-ended Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Report of the 
Implementation Committee Under the Noncompliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its 
Eleventh Meeting, U.N. Environment Programme, Annex II, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/11/1 (1995).  See 
also Letter from Russian Federation , Ministry of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources to 
Secretariat Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, October 9, 1995, and accompanying report entitled 
“Technically Feasible and Organizationally Valid Time-Table for Phasing-out Ozone-Depleting Substances (ODS),” 
on file with author.
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stock-pile ODS in anticipation of the expected ODS production phase-out.80  Since the Montreal 
Protocol’s design does not limit the actual release of ODS into the atmosphere but rather limits 
the production of ODS, Russia’s increased production and stock-piling efforts effectively 
exacerbated the delay of its phase-out obligation.  In the end, Russia effectively ignored a series 
of stern admonishments of the IC and returned to compliance on a schedule that it had set for 
itself. 
3.  Transformation of Identities, Interests, and Norms   
A third alternative to the use of deterrent sanctions has been the use of transformational 
efforts to encourage compliance.  Rather than influencing state conduct through external means, 
such as deterrent sanctions or compliance management, transformational efforts seek to induce 
compliance through internal changes – by transforming the international actors themselves.81
Compliance with treaty norms is to occur because one believes that one should do so rather than 
because one is forced to. 82  Like managerialism, transformational approaches reject the notion 
that behavior is affected only by considerations of self-interest, material advantage, and the 
desire for security and power.  However, transformational approaches assert more broadly that 
state behavior is influenced by values, ideas, and identities.83  They seek to harness such non-
utilitarian influences much more broadly than just through the duty to obey the law.  
As an illustration of such influences, consider five possible motivations for a person’s 
decision to act in an environmentally conscientious manner.  An individual can engage in 
recycling because: a) she is required to do so by municipal ordinance that punishes violations 
with a $100 fine and because she wants to avoid the fine; b) she wants to gain social approval for 
her environmentally conscientious conduct and avoid the social disapproval associated with 
throwing recyclables into the trash; c) even though she finds it inconvenient and time-consuming 
to recycle, she values the environment and believes that not to do so would be simply “wrong;” 
d) she has been taught by her parents the (unprovable) idea that she should engage in recycling 
because otherwise nobody else will; e) she identifies herself as a fervent environmentalist who is 
committed to living in an environmentally sustainable fashion.84  The recycling behavior 
80 See Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Noncompliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on 
the Work of its Twenty-seventh Meeting, para 15, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/27/4 (2001) (production of “Annex A and B substances [CFCs] . . . higher . . . to provide 
reserves to enable a smooth transition”).
81
  George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT. L. 319, 336 (“preferences 
and even underlying values of States are changed as they are, in effect, socialized by the regime to the potential 
benefits of an increasingly ambitious regulatory agenda” ). 
82
  Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note , at 203-206.
83 See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 
46 INT. ORG. 391 (1992); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical 
Framework, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 3, Judith Goldstein 
and Robert O. Keohane eds. (1993).
84
  I have tried to set out how motivations for recycling can be based in a) & b) self-interest (in avoiding formal or 
informal punishment and pleasure seeking), c) norms, d) ideas/beliefs, and e) identity.  They are not entirely 
analytically distinct.  For example, values are often times constitutive of identity.  My point here is to illustrate the 
various bases that constructivists have relied upon to justify their theoretical basis. 
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illustrated in examples a) and b) is most often characterized as the result of formal and informal 
incentives.  It would best correspond to realist and managerialist approaches to compliance.  In 
contrast, in examples c), d), and e), none of the motivations for action can fairly be characterized 
as arising out of ordinary, utilitarian self-interest considerations.  
According to constructivist descriptions of international relations,85 Harold Koh’s 
transnational legal process,86 and liberal theories about compliance with international law,87
transformation is possible because of the socially constructed nature of national identities and 
interests.  Instead of adjusting incentives to achieve compliance, as other institutionalists would, 
transformational approaches focus on changing the values, ideas, identities, and interests of the 
state actors.  If states are transformed so that they comply of their own accord, enforcement 
becomes unnecessary.  
Koh’s transnational legal process theory asserts that international legal norms, values, 
and beliefs can be internalized through repeated interaction, sustained discourse, and efforts at 
persuasion of governmental and non-governmental actors.88  In essence, Koh proposes that states 
can be “socialized” into the values and norms of the international legal system just as children 
are into a society’s values and norms through educational and other social processes.  Specific 
channels of action include the work of transnational activists and NGOs, diplomatic interactions 
and discourse, pronouncements of individuals or entities with authority (such as the International 
Court of Justice), and the work of epistemic communities.89
Epistemic communities have been especially influential with respect to international 
environmental issues.   They are “network[s] of professionals[, such as scientists,] with 
recognized expertise[,] competence[,] and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within [the] issue-area.”90  Because of the technical and scientific expertise demands of 
understanding and addressing environmental problems such as stratospheric ozone depletion and 
global climate change, epistemic communities have been unusually influential in shaping the 
perception of reality, the framing of issues, and the identification of national interests.91  For 
example, the adoption of the ozone treaties and the phase-out of CFCs was driven in large part 
by the advocacy work of atmospheric scientists and environmentalists.92
85
  See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SC. REV.
384, 388-391 (1994); Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note , at 361. 
86 See Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).  Koh’s theory is the application of the legal 
process school to international law.  See Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994).
87 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note , at 334-335; Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992) (liberal states more committed to the rule of law).
88
  Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note , at 203-205.
89 See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note , at 642-663 (also called transnational 
issue networks by Koh); see also YOUNG, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, 
supra note , at 23-25.
90
   Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT. ORG. 1, 3 
(1992). 
91
  Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a 
Reflective Research Program, 46 INT. ORG. 367, 375-377 (1992).
92 See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric 
Ozone, 46 INT. ORG. 187 (1992); RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
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The attraction of constructivist approaches has been their emphasis on cooperative and 
non-confrontational efforts.  Positive measures, such as education, persuasion, and technical 
assistance, are considered to play on the desire to accept responsibility for one’s obligation.93  In 
contrast, traditional deterrent sanctions are seen not only as unnecessary but also as counter-
productive because they evoke resentment, hostility, and resistance.94  The justification largely 
operationalizes the adage that one is more likely to catch flies with honey than with vinegar.  
Transformational approaches are the most difficult of the three alternatives to assess with 
regard to effectiveness.  After all, norm internalization and transformation usually do not result 
in easily visible changes or particular acts.  Instead, they seek to induce broad changes in 
attitudes and behavior.  Isolated instances of treaty violations do not in themselves disprove 
transformational change.
Criticism of transformation is similar to that directed at managerialism.  Avoidance of 
deterrent sanctions raises the question whether compliance is likely to occur when large stakes 
are at issue.  Furthermore, the lack of deterrent responses may be perceived by the violator and 
other states as a lack of commitment to treaty norms. 
Transformational approaches also have been blamed for contributing to “shallow” treaty 
obligations,95 a persistent complaint about environmental treaties.  While many espouse lofty 
ideals about serious global commons problems and grand hortatory language, such agreements 
are often implemented only with weak norms and obligations.  They arguably cater to the least 
common denominator because of the emphasis on cooperation.  The resulting treaty may not 
demand much in terms of substantive changes in behavior, significant commitments of resources, 
or other inconvenient or substantial sacrifices.  
For example, the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change embodied the 
aspirations of the industrialized states to cut greenhouse gas emissions levels to 1990 levels by 
the year 2000.96  However, the parties were unable to achieve a consensus on binding emissions 
reductions targets.  Instead, they adopted a “pledge and review” process that created non-binding 
commitments.97  The “pledge and review” commitments failed to achieve the desired results and 
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1998).  Issue 1 of volume 46 of International Organizations (1992) is entirely devoted 
to epistemic communities relevant to various international regimes.
Another example includes the evolution of the influence and power of the European Court of Justice and 
European Court of Human Rights to induce widespread adherence to their judgments.  See Helfer & Slaughter, 
supra note , at  290-298,  309-310, 353, 371-373 
93 See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation And The Evolving Theory of Environmental 
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1203-04 (1998). 
94 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation Control and Reaction, in 
GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 236 (Jacob Werksman ed. 1996); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in 
GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT. L. J. 51, 67-79 (1987).
95
  George Downs, et al., The Transformational Model of International Regime Design, supra note , at  478-79, 502-
509; George Downs et al., Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, supra note , at 332-335; George Downs, 
Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT. ORG. 397 (1998); David G. Victor, Enforcing International 
Law: Implications for an Effective Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 147 (1999).
96
  UNFCCC, arts. 4(2)(a) & (b).
97
  Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 451, 512-520 (1993).
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led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol targets.98
II.  Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good
Environmentalists concerned with protecting the environmental commons have long been 
familiar with the difficulties of generating or conserving public goods.99  Coincidentally, treaty 
enforcement is itself a form of an open access public good.
A.  The Nature of Public Goods
A public good is commonly described as any good that, once created, nobody can be 
excluded from making use of or benefitting from it.100  Thus, “those who do not purchase or pay 
for any of the public . . . good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the 
good.”101  The most common examples are air, national defense, or even the system of law and 
order more generally. Enforcement of legal norms is a public good because it generates 
widespread benefits, ranging from safety and security from violence and anarchy to the 
affirmative support of the pursuit of individual happiness. 
In his seminal work on collective action, Mancur Olson pointed out that even though 
public goods benefit everybody, divergence between individual and common interests oftentimes 
undermines efforts to generate them.  Since the benefits of public goods are non-excludable once 
they are created, why help generate them?  In fact, since public goods are frequently costly, 
requiring money, time, or other resources, there is a disincentive to join in their creation.102
Shirking and other strategic behavior appear to be a rational and inevitable response.103
Within national legal systems, the state creates much of the enforcement good through 
public funding of the judiciary and law enforcement authorities.  Unfortunately, in the 
international legal system there are no general subsidies or coordination of enforcement 
activities.  
98
  Claire Breidenich, Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley, James W. Rubin , The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 315, 318 (1998).
99 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
100
  Strictly speaking, public goods are defined by “jointness of supply” and “impossibility of exclusion.”  See
Russell Hardin, Collective Action 17.  Jointness of supply means that “one person’s consumption . . . does not 
reduce the amount available to anyone else.”  Id.  Impossibility of exclusion means just that – that “it is impossible 
to prevent relevant people from consuming it.”  Id. While enforcement satisfies both criteria of public goods, for 
many environmental goods, and those discussed by Mancur Olson, see Olson, supra note ___, at 14-15 n.21, only 
the characteristic of impossibility of exclusion, as a practical matter, is relevant.  
101
  Olson, supra note __, at14-15.
102
   The best known narrative description of such collective action difficulties is the “prisoner’s dilemma.”  See, e.g.,
E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 313, 324 (1985); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39-42 (1994 2d ed.);  BAIRD, 
GERTNER, AND PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, supra note , at 33-34; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 7-8.  
103
  According to Olson, “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interest.”  Olson, Jr., supra note , at 2. 
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B.  The Public Good Characteristics of International Treaty Enforcement
Enforcement by institutional deterrent sanctions is a public good in two distinct modes: 
First, institutional deterrent sanctions are instrumental means for promoting compliance.  
Second, they express the parties’ commitment to the norms embodied in the treaty and the rule of 
law. 
1.  Instrumentally Assuring Treaty Compliance: Ensuring Treaty 
Effectiveness and Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain
Institutional deterrent sanctions are primarily viewed as an instrumental means for 
promoting compliance.  They contribute to treaty effectiveness by preventing parties from 
shirking their commitments and ensuring that parties receive the benefit of their bargain.  
Benefits of international agreements will be reciprocal in practice rather than only on paper, and 
states can make deeper commitments.104
However, treaty effectiveness and preservation of the bargain serves all parties regardless 
of their contribution to enforcement efforts.  In environmental treaties protecting open access 
commons, the benefits also extend to non-parties.  For example, strict adherence to the phase-out 
schedule of ozone depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol contributes to the protection 
of the stratospheric ozone layer.  Since the ozone layer is a part of the non-excludable 
atmospheric commons, all inhabitants of earth, including states outside of the Montreal Protocol 
treaty system, are benefitted.105
2.  Maintaining Treaty Norms:  Expressive Functions of Treaty 
Enforcement 
Compliance is not the sole criterion for the usefulness of traditional enforcement 
mechanisms.106  Even in domestic legal systems, the use of deterrent sanctions does not achieve 
perfect compliance.  A complete understanding of treaty enforcement must also consider its 
expressive function and its role in maintaining the normative aspects of the law.  
As constructivist approaches have suggested, treaties are not just utilitarian instruments 
for accomplishment of some ulterior goal, a common task, or the exchange benefits.  Their 
purpose may also be non-instrumental in character.  They can recognize or establish shared 
values, interests, or identities.  
For example, many treaty norms guaranteeing human rights,107 and increasingly those 
embodied in environmental treaties, are to be obeyed for their own sake.  For example, treating 
104 See DOUGLAS BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, AND RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 56-57 
(1994).
105 See generally RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE 
PLANET (1998).
106 See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note , at  648-49.  But see Payson S. Wild, 
supra note , at 8.
107 See, e.g., Steiner & Alston, supra note , at 104-105. 
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endangered species humanely while they are in international transit108 is appropriate because it is 
the morally and ethically right act.  Like Kant’s categorical imperatives, obedience to such norms 
is inherently appropriate regardless of their utilitarian effects.  Adherence to such norms is not 
merely a tool for the achievement of other objectives, it also affirms the significance of morality 
and ethics in shaping human conduct.109
Similarly, the framework conventions on climate change and ozone depletion identify a 
common interest in avoiding the adverse impacts on the global ecological system and humanity 
of anthropogenic modification of the atmospheric commons and the stratospheric ozone layer, 
respectively.  The United Nations Charter can be seen as an affirmation of the parties’ identity as 
peaceful members of the community of nations,110 with all the attendant expectations about 
future behavior and actions.  As an expression of shared interests and identities, such treaty 
norms delineate a community to which the treaty members subscribe to.
If a treaty can be seen as an expression of a consensus about moral norms, interests, and 
identity, noncompliance damages that consensus.111  In essence, to paraphrase Robert Cover, the 
violator’s noncompliance actions put forth an alternative normative universe.112  Enforcement 
actions are necessary to affirm the existence and primacy of a common normative community to 
which all treaty parties belong to, including the violator.
Unlike a morally neutral disincentive, such as a tax,113 sanctions signal disapproval and 
denounce the wrongful act.114  They express the significance of the institution’s concern with the 
108 See Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna, art. III(2)(c), 
12.I.L.M. 1085 (1973) (norm requiring the humane in-transit treatment of endangered species).
109 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, supra note ___, at 199-200 (1961).  Cf. Peter Huang, International Environmental Law 
and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S237 (2002) (emotional or psychological attachment to particular 
norms).
110
   Charter of the United Nations, art. 2 & chap. 6, 59 Stat. 1031.  
111
    For an example of the perils of a lack of norm consensus, see David Caron, The International Whaling 
Commission, supra note .  Cf. Laurence J. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights:  International Relations Theory 
and the Commonwealth Carribean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) 
(disagreement about substantive content and obligations of human rights treaties resulting in denunciation of treaties 
by some parties).   
112 See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 54-60.
113 See, e.g., A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 256-62 (2d ed. 1924).
114
  For example, the act of  recalling of diplomatic personnel or severing diplomatic relations is unlikely to have 
significant coercive effect on another state.  It is a common sanctions tool, however, because of its symbolism in 
showing disapproval.  See, e.g., ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SANCTIONS, supra note __, at 24-
25 (2d ed. 1935); Charter of United Nations, art. 41.  See generally Ronald T. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to 
Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 299, 331-339 (1990); 
Jaime Melawad-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals, 12 Hum. Rt. Q. 1, 11-
12 (1990).  Cf. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third 
Session,  Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10, A/56/10, chp. IV.E.1 
(2001), art. 38 cmt. 3, at 264 (“Satisfaction . . . is the remedy for those injuries, not financially assessable, which 
amount to an affront to the State.  These injuries are frequently of a symbolic character, arising from the very fact of 
the breach of the obligation, irrespective of its material consequences for the State concerned.”) .
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norm violation115 and that the other parties actually “care” about the treaty’s norms and their 
breach.  As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes have put it: “There are some things we can 
express only with deeds, because words alone cannot adequately convey our attitudes.”116
Enforcement affirms that commitment.117
In this form, enforcement is a public good because it protects the continued existence of 
the community for the benefit of all.  If norm enforcement is also viewed as an independent 
Kantian duty, then it also benefits everybody else by fulfilling that duty on behalf of non-
participating community members.  
Most practically though, protecting and preserving normative communities can have 
long-term transformational benefits.  If norms, interests and identities of community members 
are preserved or more closely aligned with overall treaty goals and purposes, voluntary 
compliance will improve and punitive corrective actions may be less necessary. 
3.  Strengthening Conformance with the Rule of Law
In addition to strengthening particular substantive norms, enforcement also promotes a 
more general norm:  the rule of law.118  Because of its significance as a norm that is not only 
present in all treaties, but also exists as an independent norm in international law, it is treated 
separately here.
Governance under law “is vital for the security and well-being of the complex 
international community of the present day [by ensuring] the ordered progress of relations 
between its members.”119  The rule of law requires that those governed by law act according to 
what is legally right or wrong rather than what is convenient or within their self-interest.  It 
protects against anarchy, assures predictability and advances knowledge about the application of 
legal rules, and guarantees impartial justice.120  Its operation allows for the existence of an 
international community of nations as opposed to a true Hobbesean state of anarchy and constant 
war.  Institutional deterrent sanction are public goods because they preserve and protect a 
community delineated by the rule of law against “law-lessness” and anarchy. 
The power of the rule of law is most apparent in the influence of the International Court 
of Justice and the United Nations system.  Even though the ICJ lacks easily utilized enforcement 
mechanisms, respect for law is arguably an important source of the Court’s authority and 
persuasive influence.  Likewise, Jose Alvarez has noted that “much of the effectiveness of the 
115 See MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 57-65 (1996) 
(symbolic function of sanctions); see also Michael W. Macy, Backward-Looking Social Control, 58 AM. SOC. REV.
819, 820 (1993).
116
  Anderson & Pildes,  Expressive Theories of Law, supra note , at 1567-68.  See also REISMAN, NULLITY AND 
REVISION, supra note , at 649; Thomas Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT. L. 705, 725-
26 (1988) (reinforce relationship of rights and duties); George H. Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving 
Concepts of Criminal Law, 5 BUFF. L. REV. 22, 25-26 (1955) (“the actions of the community are likely to speak 
louder than its words”).
117
  Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note .
118 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
119
  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 43, para. 92. 
120 See Richard Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 
(1997).  
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UN collective security system is due . . . to the idea that when international subjects act, they do 
so under the rule of law.”121
Institutional deterrent sanctions strengthen the rule of law in two particular manners:  1) 
they ensure that the response to a treaty violation is impartial and governed by law, and thus 
legitimate and fair; and 2) they reinforce the best known manifestation of the rule of law in all 
treaties -- pacta sunt servanda, the duty to comply with treaty obligations undertaken.122
a.  Ensuring the Legitimacy of Sanctions Responses
The institutional nature of enforcement ensures that sanctions responses are legitimate.  
Without institutional control and endorsement, the appropriate use of coercive sanctions would 
oftentimes be indistinguishable from its inappropriate use.  The institutional nature of 
enforcement mechanisms provide a non-arbitrary and impartial method for resolving questions 
about the appropriateness and severity of sanctions.  The threat of legally unjustified and 
disproportionate uses of deterrent sanctions is reduced.  All treaty parties benefit by being 
assured that they will not arbitrarily become sanctions target.  
The institutional character of enforcement can also reduce the cost of sanctioning efforts 
and increase sanctions effectiveness.123  Sanctions legitimacy reduces opposition and resistance 
but and thereby the likelihood of retaliation.  In fact, the larger the number of states participating 
in an enforcement action, the greater the sanctions target’s cost of resentment and retaliation.  
Conversely, if sanctions illegitimacy is severe, resistance may be great and overall effectiveness 
of the entire treaty system may be undermined and all treaty parties harmed.124
b. Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Obligation to Obey the Law
 The rule of law also requires that state conduct conform with the duty to obey legal 
obligations – the “super-norm” pacta sunt servanda.125 Pacta sunt servanda is not like other 
treaty norms.126  Its existence is necessary to all treaties, and all treaty commitments presuppose 
it.127  It also carries into reality the nature of law as a set of rules that must be obeyed rather than 
only looked to for guidance.  
121
  Jose Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT. L. 1, 31 (1996).  See also Schachter, supra note , at 8.
122
  The rule that “agreements . . . must be observed.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979); Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, art. 26.
123
 See, e.g., R. FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note , at 59-62; Daniel W. 
Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 Int. 
Org. 73, 76-77 (2000).  Even the effectiveness of military intervention as a unilateral sanction presupposes neutrality 
of third-party countries in the military conflict. 
124 See, FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note , at 99.
125 See also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note , at J. 273, 332 n. 259 (pacta sunt servanda as a “meta-norm”);  H.L.A. 
Hart, supra note ___, at 228 (1961) (“basic norm” of international law).
126 See, e.g., KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE supra note , at 369-70; Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to 
Bear on Governments, supra note , at 1138-39.  In fact, it has been suggested that pacta sunt servanda is a 
peremptory norm of international law.  See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW  65-66 (3rd
ed.).
127 See, Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT. L. 529, 534 (1993).
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Enforcement of pacta sunt servanda has an important expressive function.  Enforcement 
signals the expectation that legal norms are to be obeyed for their own sake, even if doing so is 
inconvenient or against immediate material self-interest – simply because they are law.  It 
contributes to the “international legalization” of pacta sunt servanda.128  Thus, compliance is not 
just an act of moral excellence, but rather the fulfillment of a minimal duty.  
The long-term benefits may be a greater degree of voluntary compliance, reduced need 
for future enforcement actions, and correspondingly lower future enforcement costs.129  It might 
also increase the willingness of states to commit to broader and deeper obligations in future 
international agreements. Parties would be able to address a broader set of global environmental 
and other issues in a more aggressive manner, having greater confidence that the mutually-
agreed commitments would be kept.  Lack of enforcement can de-moralize other complying 
members, leading them to question the overall fairness of the treaty regime and undermining the 
parties’ commitment to it.130
III.  The Problem of Generating the “Enforcement Good”
If treaty enforcement is conceptualized as a public good, the collective action and 
strategic behavior difficulties become readily apparent.131  But there are also two other closely 
related problems that are significant: the second order nature of the collective action problem and 
the normative foundations of compliance.  They are all structural obstacles to the creation of the 
“enforcement good” and lead to less enforcement than ideally desirable.
A.  Strategic Behavior in Treaty Enforcement
As a public good, treaty enforcement must overcome collective action difficulties in 
contribution toward the cost of enforcement:132 loss of human life and financial costs in military 
interventions, damage to the sanctioner’s own economic well-being through economic sanctions, 
and generally the possibility of resentment and retaliation by the target.  In fact, economic
128
  Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against 
Corruption, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S141 (2002).
129
  A safer world with fewer conflicts for those already following the rule of law should be the result. See, e.g., 
Samuel Huntington, American Ideals Versus American Institutions, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 237 (1989), G.I. 
Kenberry, ed. (promotion and enforcement of American values ultimately provides greater security for the U.S.).
130 See Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions, supra note __, at 83-85 (backsliding of 
cooperation); LISA MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION, supra note , at 40-43 (bandwagon effect).  The problem 
would be especially serious if it continued after an authoritative determination of noncompliance.  See FISHER, 
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note , at 28-29.
131 See, e.g., Joanne Gowa, Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic 
Stability Theory?, 41 WORLD POL. 307, 319-322 (1989); LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING 
MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992); J. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 
52 INT. ORG. 269 (1998); Daniel Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions, 54 INT. ORG. 73 
(2000).
132 See, e.g., Margaret P. Doxey, supra note ___, at 106-109.  The problem does not usually arise in bilateral treaties 
since the cost of breach is concentrated on the other party.  
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sanctions create a positive incentive to shirk participation.133
When at least one party has a particularly large stake in ensuring compliance, such as a 
special harm, the individual benefits can outweigh the costs, and enforcement may still occur.134
However, that is not likely to be the case for most environmental agreements.135  Not only is the 
harm to the environmental commons spread out over many states.  It may even be externalized to 
states that are not even party to the environmental agreement, and who thus have no formal 
standing within the treaty itself.  
Many environmental problems, such as ozone depletion and global climate change, are 
the cumulative result of years, decades, and sometimes even centuries of pollution and 
environmental degradation.  The marginal harm from any particular treaty breach may appear 
small compared to the overall problem.  If the agreement is designed to promote intangible or 
incommensurable values, such as human rights or biological diversity, there is no directly 
perceptible or quantifiable harm.
The result is fewer resources devoted to encouraging compliance than might be desirable 
or economically efficient.136  If the costs are very high compared to the detriment of 
noncompliance, as may frequently be the case with unilateral sanctions, no single state may find 
it worth its while to pursue sanctions.  That may be true even if the treaty breach is substantial 
and serious, and enforcement could create an overall benefit to the treaty system and other 
parties. 
Arguably, there are limits to the influence of this dynamic.  Iterative processes and long-
term interactions alleviate free-rider difficulties.  Lengthening the time horizon and the 
availability of repeated interactions create opportunities for parties to reward cooperators or 
sanction defectors, thus increasing the level of cooperation in enforcement actions.137  Social 
structures and norms can be influential as well.138
However, the problem remains significant.  For example, even though participation in 
United Nations peace-keeping activities may involve a surprisingly large number of nations,139
133 See, e.g., Margaret P. Doxey, supra note ___, at 27-31. 
134
  For example, within the World Trade Organization, tariffs that are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion on all
imports of a particular good usually still have discriminatory effects on particular countries.  Countries tend to 
specialize in particular export goods, and not all are engaged in trade of the same items.  Violations of previously 
negotiated tariffs oftentimes have special impacts on particular states.  Such states will have a special incentive to 
bring enforcement actions. 
135
  Bilateral treaties constitute a special case since breaches by one party can localize the harm wholly on the other 
party. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 43, 45. 
136 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A 
Comparative Perspective, in WEISS AND JACOBSON, ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note , at 53, See generally section 
IV(C).
137 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra note ; Baird et al., supra note , at 159-
187; LISA MARTIN, COOERCIVE COOPERATION, supra note .  Martin also points to strong leadership and 
“bandwagoning” effects as means for overcoming free-rider problems.  Lisa Martin, supra.  However, as with 
unilateral sanctions, that seems only likely to occur effectively with powerful states such as the United States. 
138 See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note ; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  
139
  There were 165 UN peacekeeping missions during 1993-2002.  In 2002 alone, 39,652 persons from 89 countries 
contributed to peacekeeping operations.  The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, The United 
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participation is far from consistent and universal.  Moreover, the low rate of utilization of 
bilateral and multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms, especially in environmental 
agreements, indicates that strategic behavior remains a considerable problem. 
B.  The Second Order Collective Action Problem: Carrots, Sticks, and the 
Distinction of Ex Post from Ex Ante Approaches to Compliance
The difficulties of structuring incentives have been studied generally in the design of 
international environmental treaty regimes.140  Enforcement collective action problems are, 
however, complicated by their second order nature.  The distinction of deterrent sanctions from 
positive compliance incentives is illustrative.
The most common metaphor used to describe the difference between deterrent sanctions 
and positive incentives is the carrot and stick image.  It is said to be the key characteristic 
distinguishing managerial and transformational approaches from deterrence-based approaches.  
Managerial and transformational compliance models rely primarily on positive incentives to 
induce compliance, while institutional and unilateral sanctions mechanisms are commonly 
thought to rely primarily on negative disincentives such as punitive sanctions – hence the image 
of carrots and sticks.  
However, the carrots and sticks metaphor is deceptive.  Even though it seeks to contrast 
cooperative from punitive approaches, it also suggests a fundamental equivalence.  Since 
punitive sanctions are negative forms of incentives, they are arguably the converse to positive 
incentive mechanisms.  Both of their overall influence on the regulated entities is seen as 
fundamentally the same – manipulation of incentives and disincentives for particular behavior.  
If they are equivalent, however, supporters of cooperative approaches would suggest that 
positive incentives are superior to deterrence.  Carrots avoid resentment and are much less likely 
to antagonize parties than punitive sanctions sticks.  Goodwill and voluntary compliance would 
arguably be a significant advantage in making a treaty more effective.
Unfortunately, the metaphor masks two significant qualitative differences.141  First, 
institutional deterrent sanctions differ not merely in their reliance on negative incentives.142
Nations Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United Nations Operations.  (Dec. 2002), 
available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/December2002Summary.pdf>.
140 See, e.g., Ronald Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in CAMERON, ET AL., IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note , at 16-19; Jonathan Wiener, Global Environmental 
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L. J. 677 (1999); HUNTER ET AL., INTERVENTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note , at 471-475.
141
  While beyond the scope of the discussion here, Daniel Drezner has pointed to the reputational effects that use of 
and response to positive incentive and negative incentive has on their effectiveness.  See D. DREZNER, THE 
SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATE CRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-6 (1999); see also Daniel 
Drezner, The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements, in 
POWER AND THE PURSE: ECONOMIC STATE CRAFT, INDEPENDENCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Jean-Marc Blanchard 
et. al. eds.) (2000).
142 See Karin Mickelson, Carrots, Sticks or Stepping Stones: Differing Perspectives on Compliance with 
International Law, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
35, 36 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum et al. eds. 1998); Pamela Oliver, Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives 
for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations, 86 AM. J. SOC. 1356, 1361 (1980).
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They also act in very different time-frames.  Cooperative approaches and positive incentives are 
ex ante approaches that seek to prevent noncompliance events from occurring in the first place.  
In contrast, deterrent sanctions are ex post approaches to norm compliance that are not triggered 
until after a treaty breach has occurred or as it is about to unfold.  The problem of enforcement 
does not arise until after a party has decided that all of the institutional incentives, dis-incentives, 
and ex-ante breach constraints are insufficient to induce it to comply.143   Enforcement 
mechanisms, by their nature, are not triggered until all ex ante efforts at achieving compliance 
have failed. 
Second, the suggestion of equivalence also obscures differences in the difficulties of 
generating such incentives.  Unlike money, the quintessential positive incentive, there is no easy 
way to “store” or otherwise produce the effect of most punitive sanctions in advance of their 
need.  Instead, they must be invoked after a treaty breach has occurred.   For example, economic 
embargoes are the result of a  refusal to trade goods.  Such negative actions cannot be taken in 
advance of or independent of the punitive effect.  
At the same time, states have been loathe to cede control over the tools that can produce 
the effects of deterrent sanctions, the very reason for the difficulty of creating a centralized 
enforcement authority.  Making deterrence resources, such as military troops, available in 
sufficient numbers so as to constitute a serious deterrent force would cede sources of national 
power and security to others.  Similarly, giving regulatory control over commerce and banking 
activities to a treaty institution in advance of breach, so that it may impose punitive import tariffs 
or freeze assets in response to noncompliance, would seriously diminish a state’s sovereign 
control and autonomy over the activities within its own borders.  Thus, providing treaty 
institutions with the tools of generating the effects of deterrent sanctions faces even greater 
hurdles.  
Given that the production of institutional deterrent sanctions must occur after 
noncompliance has happened, enforcement presents a collective action problem that does not 
arise until after a breach has occurred.144  It raises distinct second order collective action 
problems that must be dealt with differently from the underlying problems addressed by the 
treaty.145  In essence, these difficulties indicate that the need for ex post norm enforcement 
143
  The types of breaches that I am focusing on here are those that are not inadvertent or accidental.
144
  Recognition of this problems has led to descriptions of international legal norm implementation as two-phased: 
1) the bargaining phase, and 2) the enforcement phase. See J. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International 
Cooperation, 52 INT. ORG. 269 (1998).  The bargaining phase represents the stage of international action when the 
treaty’s norms are initially negotiated. It deals directly with the primary collective action problem requiring 
international cooperation, such as global climate change or economic protectionism.   The enforcement phase 
represents the post-treaty adoption stage when implementation and compliance with the agreed-to treaty norms and 
obligations becomes crucial and defections from commitments must be addressed.  
145 See, e.g., Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH L. REV. 338 (1997); 
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note , at 64; Payson S. Wild, supra note , at 204.  In fact, there is an 
infinite regression of collective action problems that enforcement raises.  Failure by non-breaching parties to 
participate in enforcement actions should itself be the subject of an enforcement action (i.e., enforcing participation 
in an enforcement action), and so on.  For one proposed solution to this infinite regression problem, see Paul G. 
Mahoney and Chris. W. Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, University of Virginia School of 
Law 2002 Law and Economics Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 02-3 (May 2002), available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=311879>.
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cannot be completely eliminated or supplanted by ex ante positive incentives. 
C.  The Normative Foundations of Compliance and Enforcement
A third difficulty in triggering enforcement responses to noncompliance can be attributed 
to the frailty of the normative foundations of compliance and enforcement.  Within international 
diplomatic practice and the self-interested and national security driven decision-making 
processes of states, instrumental views of treaties and of enforcement predominate.  The 
normative foundations of treaties, compliance, and enforcement have largely taken a backseat.  
Two problems arise for the proper enforcement of treaty norms.  First is the proper valuation of 
the normative benefits of enforcement.  Second is the role of the authoritative and autonomous 
nature of treaty norms.
1.  The Dual Nature of Treaties and the Predominance of Instrumental 
Perspectives
Contemporary discourse about environmental enforcement and compliance has focused 
primarily on its instrumental functions  – ensuring treaty effectiveness and preserving the benefit 
of the bargain.146  As previously noted, environmental treaties also advance normative goals, 
including promoting the normative framework created by an agreement and the rule of law.  
These competing views arise out of the dual nature of treaties: environmental agreements 
are at once both contract and legislation.  That duality reflects their origins in the acts of 
sovereigns that are legally autonomous and independent of each other.  Like contracts, treaties 
impose only obligations to the extent that the sovereigns have consented to them.  Like an act of 
legislation, they also restrict a state’s freedom of action through the newly-created legal norm, 
and hence cedes some amount of sovereignty to the treaty regime. 
As contracts, treaties are designed to achieve the utilitarian purposes of the parties by 
“creating legal rights and obligations between” them.147  Similar to contracts between private 
individuals, treaties are voluntary and reciprocal commitments based on mutual consent.  The 
rules governing treaty application and interpretation incorporate many principles governing the 
creation, interpretation, and conclusion of contracts.148  For example, the creation of a treaty 
146 See, e.g., supra note 2.  See also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note ___, art. 49 cmt. 3, at 326.
147 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A TREATISE, VOL. 1, 877 (1955).  See also Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, pt. III, introductory note, p. 147 (treaty law “resembles domestic 
contract law, as international agreements often resemble contracts”); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at 186 & n. 8.  See also  Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
148
  Brierly, supra note , at 243 (“[i]n most respects the general principles applicable to private contracts apply”).  
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).  Of course, “analogies from the 
contract law of any particular country are to be used with caution.”  Rest. 3rd Foreign Relat. Law pt. III, introductory 
note, p. 147 (1987).  For example, requirements such as consideration have no applicability.  Brierly, supra note , at 
244; Rest. 3rd Foreign Relations Law, pt. III, introductory note, p. 147.  Nor does a statute of frauds exist for treaties.  
Id.
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requires both capacity and consent of the parties,149 and it may be invalidated for mistake, fraud, 
and coercion.150
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is a well-known example of a contract-type 
treaty.151  Designed to promote free trade within the international community, the GATT’s 
primary mission was, for a long time, the reduction of tariffs and trade barrier.  Most 
characteristic of the contractual understanding of the GATT was how most of the tariff 
negotiation rounds occurred:  by the exchange of various tariff concessions.  In each of the 
GATT trade rounds, the contracting parties to the GATT sought to come to a mutually agreed-
upon and carefully considered bargain in which each provided some tariff concessions and 
received others in return.152
As legislative acts, treaties set out legal frameworks that elaborate commonly agreed-
upon norms and create “general rules of conduct among a considerable number of States”153
They are institutional mechanisms designed to advance some larger communal good or 
benefit.154  Oftentimes, they may advance ideals and conceptions of community that do not 
directly inure to the benefit of any particular party, but indivisibly advance the welfare of 
everybody, including those not party to the treaty system.  Their legislative nature is reflected in 
the characterization of international agreements as international law155 as well as by their 
relationship to customary international law.156  International treaties that the United States Senate 
has approved by 2/3 majority are also part of the law of the United States.157
The legislation conception is most strongly expressed  in “[m]ultilateral agreements open 
to all states.”158  The international human rights law system is one of the most prominent 
examples.  Especially when they are prepared within the United Nations system, multilateral 
human rights instruments are designed to attract the widest participation possible and to become 
149 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 7-8, 11-15; see also Brierly, supra, note , at 243; H. 
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 1, 890.  Cf. Rest. 3rd, Rest. Foreign Relations § 313, note 1 (“permissible 
reservation is in effect a “counter-offer”).
150 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 48-52.
151
  55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947).  While the GATT has been superseded by the WTO, most of its substantive principles 
and provisions continue to exist largely unaltered in the World Trade Organization.
152 See JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note , at 372-384. 
153
  Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law 878-79; Rosenne, supra note , at 124.  Brierly noted that “they do 
in fact perform the function which a legislature performs in a state, though they do so only imperfectly.”  Brierly, 
supra note , at 59-60. 
154 See, e.g., PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 2-3 (Jose Mico and Peter Haggemacher trans. 
Kegan Paul Int. 2d ed. 1995) (1972).  See also Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. Reports 15.
155 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, pt. I, introductory note, p. 17.
156
  Treaties are, at a minimum, co-equal as a source of international law to customary international law.  See
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102; Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1).  Cf.
Rosenne, supra note , at 129 (suggesting that the International Law Commission’s approach to the drafting of part V 
(invalidity, termination, and suspension of treaties) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflected an 
understanding that was contrary to traditional principles of contract doctrines).  They may also crystallize or 
supersede customary law.  Vienna Convention art. 38; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102, cmt. j.  
See also Shabtai Rosenne, supra note , 1926-1986, pp. 123-124.
157
  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111. 
158
  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 102, ct. f. 
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universally applicable.159  Multilateral environmental agreements dealing with global 
environmental issues also exhibit many characteristics of universality, 
The  contractual and legislative natures of treaties are not exclusive of each other.  Many 
treaties exhibit characteristics of both.160  Nevertheless, law-based perspectives of treaties, and 
international relations more generally, remain weak.  Discourse about national self-interest and 
power, and thus the utilitarian character of treaty instruments, remain the bedrock of 
international politics and the foreign policy of many nations, especially the United States.  In 
fact, the wide-spread perception and the oft-repeated slogan that “international law is not really 
law” is one manifestation.  
2.  The Problem of Valuing the Benefits of Enforcement
The contractual, utilitarian model of treaties and the remedies it affords may be 
appropriate for some treaties, such as international trade agreements.161  Unfortunately, this is 
likely to be the exception rather than the rule.  Not all of the functions served by treaties, 
including the public expression and shaping of norms, values, and state identities can readily be 
fit into a contract model.  That is especially true for multilateral agreements involving the 
environment and human rights.  Ordinarily, contract remedies, such as compensation or 
reciprocal non-compliance,162 will be inadequate as an enforcement response or run counter to 
overall treaty objectives. 
For example, compensation remedies will ordinarily run into measurement difficulties.  
Even when environmental harms, such as pollution, are readily visible, appropriately quantifying 
them and showing causation has proven to be extremely difficult.  Consider responsibility for 
ozone depletion.  Accurate valuation of the environmental and public health injuries would only 
be part of the challenge.  Quantification would also require determining the relative contributions 
to ozone depletion of current and past activities of other states, taking into account the 
atmosphere’s natural ability to re-generate itself over long periods of time.  Superimposed on 
these difficulties would be proof of causation problems as to what types of ecological harms and 
human diseases could be attributed to increased solar UV-radiation as opposed to other 
environmental influences.  
There are also the criticisms of market-based valuation methodologies which are 
notorious for failing to properly account for services and other vital functions of ecological 
systems.163  For many environmental goods such as clean air, no applicable markets exist.  Yet, 
there can be no question that such services and functions are no less valuable and important to 
159
  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 313, note 1.
160 See, e.g., Edwin Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations:  Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1549 (1991). 
161
  In the GATT and the WTO, compensation for breaches is obtained via suspension of tariff concessions –
reciprocal non-compliance or a form of trade sanction.  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2:  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22, 33 I.L.M. 1143 
(1994).   See also Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, at 340-344; Steve Charnovitz, 
Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, supra note , at 802, 822;  Joost Pauwelyn, supra note , at 338-341. 
162 See Rest. (Third) For. Relat. sec. 901.
163 See, e.g., Ohio v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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human life than goods available in the market place.
Even harder to assess for compensation purposes are non-economic and non-instrumental 
values of nature.  Aesthetic and existence values are the best known and most widely accepted 
ones.  But they also include non-economic values assigned by perspectives advocating animal 
rights, environmental ethics, or cultural values in the environment.  Methodologies, such as 
contingent valuation, are helpful in this regard.  The controversy surrounding their use in the 
U.S., however, has shown that there is little consensus about the types of environmental values 
that should be included and the criteria for measuring them.  There is no reason to believe that 
such valuation difficulties are any easier to deal with internationally.  
What about the diffuse and long-term benefits of strong and respected treaty norms, 
including the rule of law:  greater levels of compliance, lower enforcement costs, and more order 
in the international system?  Or the consequences of unchecked breaches:  demoralization of 
other complying treaty parties and the adverse precedential effect of inviting future breaches.164
Quantitative valuation would seem just as difficult or impossible.  
Of course, compensation is not the only remedy for breach.  But any perspective driven 
primarily by considerations of self-interested and national security concerns would rely in the 
first instance on a utilitarian analysis of enforcement - the methodology underlying contract 
perspectives of treaties.  Given difficulties of valuation, enforcement will occur at less than an 
optimal and desirable level. 
3.  The Authoritative Nature of Treaty Norms
A second problem that arises out of the predominance of instrumental attitudes is neglect 
of the authoritative and autonomous nature of treaty norms.  First, as components of a system of 
public law, international treaties give rise to norms that are legal and thus authoritative.  They 
command obedience regardless of inconvenience or immediate self-interest, unless excused by 
other legal doctrines, such as necessity, consent, and the operation of conflicting peremptory 
norms.165  As a source of compliance, legal norms operate independently from instrumental 
considerations.166
Second, as a legal institution, the treaty is an entity that possesses an identity and legal 
existence separate from that of the states that created and are parties to it.167  The resulting treaty 
164 Cf. Yoshida, supra note , at 137 (noting concern by developing countries about consequences of illegal Russian 
ODS exports on their markets.  See generally Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation," Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-1218 (1967).
165 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra ___, at arts. 20-26. 
166
  That is not to say that social welfare considerations are not be relevant.  See, e.g., United States v. Caroll 
Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (cost-benefit balancing in negligence analysis); see generally RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW.  However, law as a basis for compliance and enforcement is not co-
extensive with and necessarily dependent upon its social welfare costs and benefits.  Legal norms compel obedience 
because conforming one’s behavior to the norm is the appropriate course of action. 
167 See, e .g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79 (1949) 
(allowing United Nations to recover damages on behalf of its employees against a non-member state); Rest. (Third) 
For. Relat. sec. 233.  See also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW , supra note , at 197-99; 
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal Organizations, 42 J. CONFL. RES. 3, 24-26 
(1998). 
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norms are thus autonomous of the interests of the parties.168  Norm compliance is an institutional 
interest that transcends the parties directly affected by a breach.169
Instrumentalist approaches challenge that authoritative and autonomous character.  For 
states that subscribe primarily to a foreign policy based on rational self-interest and power 
politics, norms can play no significant role in their decision-making processes.  Unless social 
welfare analysis can provide a persuasive reason for action in response to a breach of treaty 
norms, such states are unlikely to take enforcement measures.  If compliance occurs only and 
solely as a matter of immediate self-interest and convenience, it can be expected that compliance 
will cease when self-interest and convenience no longer provide the motivation to comply.  
Worse yet, instrumentalist perspectives can lead to the subversion of appropriate 
enforcement responses when breach responses are deliberately manipulated.  For example, a 
violator may bribe certain key parties, maybe the most powerful party states, in order to make 
inaction the rationally preferred course of action.  The result might not only be failure to 
mobilize institutional support for sanctions but also subversion of the normative and legal 
character of international law more generally.
Over the years, the rule of law has arguably grown stronger within international relations.  
One measure may be the increased number of instances in which enforcement actions appear to 
be “altruistic,” and thus independent of national self-interest.  U.N. Security Council intervention 
in a number of humanitarian crises, including in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and other 
countries in the 1990s are some examples.170  Such instances remain rare, however.  They remain 
unheard of with respect to breaches of environmental agreements, suggesting that the rule of law 
continues to be weak.
 IV.  Generating the “Enforcement Good”
Given the structural complexities of triggering enforcement actions, how can one increase 
enforcement responses to non-compliance?  At least three general approaches suggest 
themselves:  1) changing the enforcement calculus, 2) promoting entrepreneurial enforcement, 
and 3) treaty design.   
A.  Changing the Enforcement Calculus
If collective inaction and strategic behavior are a result of individual self-interest mis-
aligned with communal good, one solution is to alter the costs and benefits to promote 
enforcement actions.  This may be accomplished either by creating incentives for behavioral 
changes or changing the valuation of enforcement and compliance.  The result is to modify the 
168 See, e.g., TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 3-19 (1983); Kal Raustiala & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538-558, 543 (Carlsnaes et al., eds.) (2002).
169 See also IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (independent 
categorical imperative to punish breaches of law); NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 17-18, 24-56 (1995) (independent duty to punish or enforce the law present in 
many religions and philosophical writings and emergency of legal duty to enforce against individual law violators).
170 See, e.g., Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323 (1996).
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structure of the collective action problem and the likelihood of enforcement.
1. Adjusting the Incentives to Engage in Enforcement
Enforcement activities can be stimulated by increasing the positive benefits flowing from 
a successful outcome or reducing the cost of initiation or participation.  Alternatively, the 
negative detriment of inaction can be increased. 
The most direct method of increasing benefits is through financial incentives.  
Enforcement can be subsidized through a common fund, for example created through financial 
contributions from treaty parties.  Even though such a fund would raise separate collective action 
problems, there is ample precedent for the feasibility of this option.171  Alternatively, a 
successful party might be allowed to recover the cost of enforcement action from the losing 
party, similar to the attorney fees concept in many national legal systems.  Benefits from a 
successful enforcement outcome could also be increased by creating a bounty, for example as it 
is provided for under U.S. law in qui tam actions.172
The effect of such financial incentives should not be overestimated, however.  For 
industrialized countries, and even many large developing nations, the administrative costs of 
pursuing an enforcement action is likely to be insignificant.  Even a bounty in the millions of 
dollars is arguably a pittance considering that the national budgets of many states is measured in 
the billions and those of industrialized countries in the hundreds of billions of dollars.  Other 
considerations and costs, including the potential for retaliatory actions, damage to long-term 
relationships and mutually beneficial arrangements, and the cost of human lives if military 
intervention is pondered, are likely to be much more significant.173
Promoting enforcement through positive financial incentives also entails institutional 
costs.  Not every violation merits sanctions.  Even if an enforcement action is well-grounded in 
fact and in good faith, it might not deserve the expenditure of institutional resources for 
vindication.174  If positive incentives for enforcement are sufficiently great, they might encourage 
the abuse or over-application of sanctions, for example to de minimis breaches.
171 See [Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund]; [Global Environmental Facility]
172
   As discussed above, compensation remedies will usually be inadequate incentive for enforcement actions 
because of valuation and proof of causation difficulties.  Furthermore, damage claims with regard to environmental 
noncompliance will oftentimes accrue to individuals or businesses rather than states.  As a result, analogous 
problems of mis-aligned incentives arise for states to initiate enforcement actions.  Unless the claims involve 
significant national interests or of a particular high profile,“the state to whom [the national] belongs may be 
unwilling to take up his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits.”  Brierly, supra note , at 218.  But 
see, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), Arbitral Tribunal, 1941, 3 UN Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 
(1941); see also J. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, The Canadian Yearbook of Int’l Law 213-17 (1963).
173
  Imposition of import tariffs as a trade sanctions can create more significant financial rewards to the enforcer.  
See, e.g., Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution 
in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 179, 199 (2002).  But they exact also economic costs from the 
enforcer’s economy. 
174
  It is also not clear how easily such incentives and disincentives could be calibrated to provide an appropriate set 
of incentives for enforcers.  Neal Katyal has also pointed out in the criminal law context that increased deterrent 
efforts can lead to undesirable substitution effects.  Neal Kuma Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2385 (1997).
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A less direct means of increasing enforcement benefits is to improve the effectiveness of 
sanctions.  If enforcement failures are attributable to expectations that sanctions are ineffective or 
are unlikely to achieve compliance, appropriate sanctions choice and design can increase the 
benefit of sanctions efforts.  
The alternative to positive inducement is to increase the detriment of inaction.175
Negative incentives may be most useful in changing the behavior of states that would otherwise 
stand on the side-lines and ignore a treaty violation. In concept, such a negative approach is little 
different from the use of punitive sanctions to encourage compliance in the first instance – the 
use of sticks rather than carrots.  One might even view such efforts as the “enforcement” of 
sanctions obligations.  Participation in multilateral sanctioning activity, such as a trade embargo, 
would become a sanctionable duty.  Failure to participate would trigger punitive sanctions 
itself.176
One version of this has been studied by Lisa Martin in her work on coerced cooperation 
in sanctioning activity.177  Her work concluded that within recent decades, multilateral 
cooperation in the maintenance of trade sanctions occurred in a number of instances because the 
cost of non-cooperation was a significant motivating factor.  Failure to participate would have 
brought serious adverse consequences for the defecting party.  For example, the European 
Community imposed trade sanctions in the1980s against Argentina because of the Falklands war 
with Britain.  Even though “the Irish government developed a strong distaste for supporting the 
British through economic measures . . . , it maintained sanctions through their original term 
because the EC would not agree to lifting them.  Afraid of jeopardizing other EC benefits, such 
as farm subsidies, Ireland reluctantly abided by its obligations.”178  The potential for negative 
reactions from the European Community led Ireland to cooperate in maintaining the trade 
sanctions.179
2. Changing the Valuation of Enforcement and the Rule of Law
The decision calculus can also be altered more indirectly by changing the valuation of 
enforcement.  One might modify national attitudes about the desirability of enforcement, for 
example by promoting the incorporation of treaty norms and the rule of law into national law and 
culture.180
However, effecting changes in norms, values, and identity encounters the same 
difficulties that transformational approaches to compliance must face.  It requires internalization 
175
  While the idea of increasing the detriment for failure to initiate enforcement actions might seem ludicrous, the 
idea of coercing  or committing oneself in advance to respond to security threats is not.  It was the basis of mutually 
assured destruction strategies during the nuclear arms race of the Cold War era.  
176 See Paul G. Mahoney and Chris. W. Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, supra note ___.
177
  Lisa Martin, supra note .
178 Id at 245.
179
  The example also demonstrates that withdrawal of benefits may serve as a sufficient deterrent to induce 
sanctions participation if there is sufficient reliance on them.  See Baird, Gertner, supra note , at 184-185.
180
  In the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, supra note ___, one might view this approach as changing the pay-off 
matrix through means internal to the prisoners – maybe, the prisoners have been led to see the wrongfulness of their 
ways with regard to “snitching” and betraying each other. They have been taught “honor among thieves.” 
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of treaty norms, including alteration of governmental perceptions of the national self-interest.  Its 
success as a source of enforcement is arguably no greater than the ability of transnational legal 
processes to promote compliance in the first instance. 
The practical reality, however, may be less daunting.  Normal treaty implementation 
processes purposefully incorporate treaty norms into national law.  Furthermore, treaty norms are 
often already deeply-held and intensely valued by many states.181  For example, many of the 
human rights norms embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reflect 
principles embedded in the legal systems of the United States, Western Europe, and other 
democratic nations.  With respect to the environment, treaties are more the expression of existing 
agreement about the importance of environmental protection and sustainable development than 
the creation of new values and norms.
Instead, the difficulty arises in the systematic engagement of treaty norms so that they 
may serve as a consistent source of enforcement responses rather than as a pretext for other 
foreign policy objectives.  The problem is, in other words, a rule of law issue.
Liberal theories have argued that adherence to the rule of law in the international system 
depends in part on whether a state adheres to the rule of law within its internal governance 
system.182  Promotion of democratic structures and political systems based on the rule of law 
thus seem to be one answer.  Anne Marie Slaughter and Laurence Helfer have also suggested 
that linkage of international institutions to national institutions committed to the rule of law, such 
as domestic court systems, can contribute to that goal substantially.183  In effect, engaging those 
parts of a nation’s government committed to the preservation and implementation of legal norms 
can strengthen the country’s commitment to international law. 
3.  Is More Enforcement Always Better?:  Limits on the Use of Coercive 
Sanctions
Prescriptions that promote more frequent and consistent enforcement responses to 
noncompliance, however, must also consider the question whether more enforcement is always 
better.  There are at least three types of considerations: 1) the legality of the imposed sanctions, 
2) legitimate but non-legal reasons for non-enforcement, such as concerns about enforcement 
resources, fairness, and justice, and 3) the problem of treaty effectiveness.
First sanctions responses to noncompliance may be limited by the very instrument that 
authorizes them in the first instance.184  However, environmental treaty agreements have 
generally failed to articulate such mechanisms.  In the absence of specific limitations imposed by 
treaty, other limitations apply.  Threats or actual uses of force remain subject to the prohibitions 
of the United Nations Charter.185  Sanctions must also be directed at the responsible state and not 
third-parties.186  They must be temporary in nature,187 proportionate to the violation,188 be 
181
  Chayes, The New Sovereignty, supra note ____. But see Oona Hathaway, ____, ___ Yale L.J. ___
182 See, e.g., Fernando Teson,  The Kantian Theory of International Law, supra note ___.
183
  Helfer and Slaughter, supra note , at 331.
184 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra ___, chapter 2 cmt. 9, at 328.
185
  Rest. (Third) For. Relat. sec. 905(2).  See also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra ___, at art. 50(1)(a).
186 See also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra ___, at art. 49(1) & (2).
187 Id. at arts. 49(2) & (3), 53.
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preceded by notice of the intent to impose sanctions and an offer to negotiate,189 and not violate 
certain basic obligations, including peremptory norms of international law.190
In the absence of a formal institutional enforcement mechanism, the legality of sanctions 
activities by states who are not directly and materially harmed by the breach is unclear.  Articles 
48 & 54 of the International Law Commission’s draft Articles on State Responsibility 
acknowledge the interest of such states in the breach.  However, the Commission did not take a 
position on the permissibility of individual enforcement actions purely to vindicate a collective 
interest in treaty compliance.191  Nevertheless, states in the past have done so when there were 
gross violations of international human rights laws, even without claiming a special injury.192
Beyond illegality, there are other legitimate reasons why sanctions imposition may be 
inappropriate for each and every noncompliance event. Just as enforcement decisions within 
national legal systems requires the considered exercise of prosecutorial discretion,193 so does the 
enforcement of environmental treaties.  Limited resources require prioritizing the most pressing 
non-compliance events.  Some breaches may be de minimis or inadvertent and the imposition of 
sanctions may be of little institutional benefit  Other breaches may be persistent and willful, and 
even if small may call for sanctions because of the substantial symbolic significance and 
deterrent effect. 
Fairness and justice considerations might also justify rejection of enforcement 
proceedings.  If there is significant uncertainty or lack of proof, considerations of justice 
arguably require that enforcement be declined.194  That is especially appropriate given that the 
need to defend against an enforcement action can be a burden in itself. 
Another consideration might be unintended collateral effects on “innocent” 
populations,195 what one might call “punishment externalities.”  In fact, the strongest sanctioning 
mechanisms, such as trade embargos and military interventions, usually affect the civilian 
population much more seriously than any of the governmental actors targeted by them.  Because 
188 Id. at art. 51.
189 Id. at art. 52.
190 Id. at art. 50(1).  See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra ___, chapter 2 cmt. 6, at 327.
191 See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note ___, at art. 54, cmts. 1-6, at 349-355.  See also Robert 
Rosenstock & Margo Kaplan, The Fifty-third Session of the International Law Commission, 96 Am. J. Int. L. 412, 
413(2002).
192 See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note ___, at 350-353.
193 See generally Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-27.100 to 9-27.320, U.S. Department 
of Justice (setting out criteria and considerations for initiating and declining federal criminal prosecutions).  
Prosecutors may consider in particular law enforcement priorities, nature and seriousness of offense, deterrent effect 
of prosecution, person’s culpability, person’s criminal history, person’s willingness to cooperate, person’s personal 
circumstances, and probably sentence or consequences.  Id. at 9-27.230.  Impermissible considerations include the 
defendant’s race, sex, religion, and political beliefs, personal animus, or professional or personal advantage.  Id. at 
9-27.260.  For a general evaluation of prosecutorial discretion, see James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
194 See, e.g., U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-27.220(B) (“as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the 
efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the government 
believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact”).
195 See, e.g., Elias Davidson, The Debate on Economic Sanctions: A Story of Blind Spots and Obfuscations, 
unpublished manuscript on file with author.
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the hardships imposed on the target nation’s people can amount to collective punishment,196 a 
decision to proceed with sanctions in such instances can undermine important values, including 
those associated with not punishing the innocent.  
The extra-legal, discretionary considerations noted here are not exhaustive.  Even though 
they are not formally endorsed by law, they are nevertheless legitimate decision-making criteria.  
Such discretion, however, presents a converse risk.  Discretion may be abused, held hostage by 
norm violators, or otherwise be used as pretext for illegitimate reasons for non-enforcement. 
The response to the problem of abuse of enforcement discretion is similar to that of the 
problem of sanctions abuse itself – institutionalization.  Efforts to institutionalize parts of the 
enforcement process are evident in the Montreal Protocol and the Convention on the Regulation 
of International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).  Both have shifted determinations of 
noncompliance as well as determinations about the appropriateness and severity of sanctions 
responses to collective decision-making bodies.197  In the Montreal Protocol, that function has 
been fulfilled by the Implementation Committee.198  Within CITES, that has been its secretariat 
and prior to 1989 also its Standing Committee.199  Alternatively, sanctions determination could 
be entrusted to individuals who serve in independent, quasi-judicial capacities, subject to the 
review of the treaty parties.
Finally, deterrence responses to noncompliance usually do not operate in a self-contained 
system.  The ultimate option of exit – treaty denunciation – is usually available.  In other words, 
imposition of deterrent sanctions might evoke not avoidance of sanctions through norm 
compliance or the acceptance of such sanctions, but instead exit from the treaty system.200  Thus, 
overly strict and severe application of sanctions could reduce overall treaty effectiveness by 
leading to the abrogation of the treaty by the offending party.201  In fact, this was likely one 
concern that led the Montreal Protocol parties to forego harsher responses to Russia’s persistent 
noncompliance.202 Given Russia’s significant capacity to produce and potentially use ozone 
depleting substances, its withdrawal from the treaty could be seen as much more 
counterproductive to the specific goal of protecting the stratospheric ozone layer than tolerating 
its noncompliance. 
The threat of exit is a particularly difficult challenge.  While the threat may be real, so is 
the potential for abuse as a means of defending against enforcement actions.  As a matter of legal 
principle, such considerations arguably are not appropriate grounds for non-enforcement.  Yet, 
196 FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE, supra note , at 48-51, 69; Payson S. Wild, supra note , at 213-216, 218-219.
197 See, e.g., Rosalind Reeve, supra note , at 91-132.
198 See supra section ____..
199
  Since 1989, the Standing Committee has been responsible for “deciding on measures against non-compliant 
countries, including trade sanctions on the basis of Secretariat recommendations.”  Rosalind Reeve, supra note , at 
266.  Institutionalization has not been complete, however.  The individual members are representatives of their states 
and do not act in an independent capacity.  Questions of impartiality and objectivity are thus not surprising.  
Rosalind Reeve has suggested that party members of the CITES’ Standing Committee have on occasion acted and 
voted blatantly on the basis of their own national self-interest rather than as representatives of other states or even of 
the international community.  See Rosalind Reeve, supra note , at 267; section II(D)(3)(b).
200 See Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, arts. 54, 56. See also Baird, Gertner & Picker, supra note , at 195. 
201 See, e.g., Laurence J. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights:  International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Carribean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
202 See discussion supra section ____.  
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practical politicians and the reality of the international system may demand it.  General 
avoidance of such conflicts, whether by pro-active management of compliance or by appropriate 
tailoring of the sanction, would serve the treaty system better.  Otherwise, the adverse precedent 
of non-enforcement could significantly undermine the long-term viability of the treaty and the 
credibility of the treaty norms as a whole.
B. Promoting Entrepreneurial Enforcement
Another option is entrepreneurial enforcement.  Entrepreneurial enforcement means that 
non-governmental entities and private citizens can trigger or participate in enforcement action.  
The approach gives others the ability to take supplementary enforcement actions, similar to the 
authorization of citizen suits under the federal environmental statutes203 or qui tam actions.
There are at least three reasons to take private or entrepreneurial enforcement seriously.  
First, entrepreneurial enforcement would allow the shifting of some of the cost of enforcement 
from a limited number of states to a much greater number of interested individuals and non-
governmental organizations.  Those willing and able to bear the cost of enforcement, other than 
states, could participate in the process.  Like in the U.S. environmental regulatory system, 
enforcement entrepreneurs could step into an enforcement vacuum.204
Second, decentralization of enforcement recognizes the increased importance of 
transnational actors.  Entities such as environmental NGOs or human rights groups oftentimes 
have more of a stake in the enforcement of treaty norms than states. 
Third, the converse benefit of decentralization is its ability to prevent the capture of the 
enforcement machinery by particular interest groups or to be held hostage by political 
considerations.  By allowing those interested in enforcement to seek the vindication of treaty 
norms themselves, the state is disaggregated from its monolitic and unitary identity.205
Constituent parts interested in the furtherance of international values and norms can transcend 
other constituent parts more oriented toward national self-interest or, worse, focused only on 
private self- serving gains.206
Private enforcement of international treaty norms has contributed significantly to the 
authority and effectiveness of the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).207  Within environmental agreements, the citizen 
submission process of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) 
reflects an entrepreneurial approach to non-compliance.208
203 See, e.g., Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §1365; Clean Air Act(CAA), 42 U.S.C. §7604; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
§6972.
204
  For a discussion of the challenges of private enforcement of treaty obligations in U.S. law, see Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992). 
205
  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note ___, at 335.
206 But see R. Fisher, Improving Compliance, supra note ___, at 173-183.
207
  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note ___, 288, 293, 296-97. 
208
  While it is not a true enforcement mechanism, however, the multitude of submissions since the process has come 
into existence suggests that entrepreneurial involvement of private individuals and non-governmental organizations 
can significantly increase the frequency of responses to non-compliance events.  See generally John Knox,  A New 
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C.  Treaty Design and the Structure of Regulation
A third approach is to consider treaty design and the structure of regulation more broadly.  
Like efforts to encourage compliance,209 treaty design can encourage enforcement by altering the 
structure (or “architecture”) of regulation.  One such opportunity focuses on the nature of 
environmental degradation and the structure of indirect regulation by most multilateral 
environmental agreements.210
The vast majority of environmental treaties impose obligations primarily on national 
governments.211  Since most environmental degradation, however, is caused by private individual 
or business activity, treaty commitments usually embody either explicit or implicit mandates for 
party states to regulate such activities.  In effect, environmental treaties endeavor to “regulate” 
the regulatory activities of states.  Noncompliance of party states arises frequently because of a 
failure to implement the mandate to regulate. 
As a result, the entities responsible for treaty compliance and targets of enforcement 
actions (states) are not the same entities that ultimately must change their behavior to achieve the 
treaty objective (individuals and businesses).  Non-compliance sanctions will have litle direct 
effect on them even though they are actually responsible for the failure to achieve substantive 
treaty objectives.  The historical experience of federal environmental regulation illustrates the 
resulting challenge for achieving environmental goals.212
  Prior to the vast expansion of the federal government’s power with regard to the 
environment in the 1960s and 70s, environmental regulation was the primary responsibility of 
the individual states.  When the failure of state and local governments to manage rising levels of 
pollution and environmental degradation became a national concern, the federal government 
initially intervened with financial aid and research assistance.213  These programs failed to 
achieve the desired pollution abatements.  Congress then began to require states to adopt various 
environmental standards.214  These efforts failed as well.  Significant improvements came only 
about when the federal government asserted primary regulatory authority in the 1970s. Those 
legislative changes vested a newly-created EPA with permit issuance, standard-setting, and 
Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The Submission Procedure of the NAFTA 
Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (2001); Tseming Yang, supra note ___.
209 See supra sections I(B)(2)&(3).
210 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Leg. Stud. 661 (1998) (change in “architecture”).  
To use the prisoner’s dilemma metaphor, the prosecutor might seek an entirely different way of obtaining 
conviction.  Rather than encouraging confession, incriminating evidence could also be obtained in other ways, for 
example by looking for other evidence or eyewitnesses.
211 See Lauterpacht, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 636-639 (1955). See also Carlos Vazquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1088-1093 (1992).
212
  Fisher, Improving Compliance, supra note ___, at 42-46 (“imposing sanctions on the component states of the 
U.S.”)
213 See Robert Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note __, at 1155-1157; William Futrell, The History of 
Environmental Law, supra note ___, at 30-31. 
214
  William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, supra note ___, at 31.  Such steps included requiring states 
to adopt water quality standards in 1965 and raising federal involvement in air pollution issues by creating an 
ambitious framework to improve air quality in 1967.  Id.
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criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement authority.215
The expansion of federal regulatory authority drastically change its role.  Rather than 
promoting state regulation and “regulating the regulators,” the federal government asserted direct 
oversight over environmental matters.  The effect was to circumvent the states.
Contemporary multilateral environmental agreements have largely followed in the 
footsteps of the pre-1970s U.S. regulatory efforts:  committing member governments to focus 
domestic regulatory attention on environmental issues, providing for information exchange and 
communication between the treaty parties, and assisting in various capacity building efforts.  The 
historical experience of the U.S. suggests that treaty norms should also focus on individual 
conduct,216 in addition to enlisting the help of national governments.
The result would forge a tighter connection between treaty objectives and the norms 
designed to achieve them.  First, it would separate the interests of the enforcer (the state) from 
those of the target (the polluter).  Party states would not face the dilemma of a coercive sanctions 
mechanism that could be used against itself in the future.  It would also avoid the potential 
damage and alienation that punitive sanctions can cause to the cooperative relationship between 
the treaty institution and the member states.  Strong enforcement mechanisms could thus become 
more palatable to the most powerful states, whose power would otherwise be challenged.  
Second, focusing on individual conduct strengthens the effectiveness of sanctions.  
Sanctions can directly affect the incentive to pollute.217  When sanctions are imposed on 
governments, responsible officials oftentimes lack significant personal stake in compliance and 
must consider competing government priorities and national interests.  Resistance is much 
likelier.  Finally, making norms and the associated sanctions applicable to particular individual 
conduct strengthens the message of moral condemnation. 
Another approach to facilitating sanctions processes is to privatize both compliance and 
enforcement.  Ronald Mitchell’s study of oil pollution prevention efforts under the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is illustrative.218  Mitchell 
found that MARPOL decisions directly imposing equipment standards on oil tanker design were 
a far superior strategy in achieving oil pollution prevention goals than direct limits on the 
discharge of pollutants that had to be enforced by party states.219  The equipment standards were 
largely irreversible once put into place.  In contrast, discharge limits required intense monitoring 
efforts in order to be effective.  Moreover, the standards also took advantage of existing 
government enforcement mechanisms and shifted the focus from party states to the entities 
215 See William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, supra note ___, at __.
216 See, e.g., Jordan Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
51 (1992); Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443, 
475-489; Payson Wild, supra note ___, at 180-195, 222; R. Fisher, Improving Compliance, supra note ___, at 73.
217 See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT. L. J. 473 
(1999)
218
  12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973), entered into force Oct. 2, 1983.
219
  Regulatory approaches that required government enforcement, such as monitoring, investigation, and 
prosecution of discharge prohibitions, were enforced at very low frequency.  In contrast, approaches that could be 
enforced by private parties led to virtually 100% compliance.   See RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL OIL 
POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 123-188, 221-292 (1994).
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engaged in the conduct that could result in oil pollution.220
Finally, the equipment standards also recruited the classification societies and insurers of 
vessels as norm enforcers.  These entities have taken on significant roles in ensuring that new 
vessel construction conforms with MARPOL standards.221  The overall result was to shift 
enforcement responsibility to private entities and allow international legal norms to apply 
directly within, or to penetrate into, a domestic legal system, thereby engaging their 
transformative function more effectively.222
V.  An Examination of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol’s Non-Compliance Mechanism
The newest member of the family of enforcement instruments is the non-compliance 
mechanism of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.  The mechanism introduces new ideas to treaty 
enforcement and holds much promise.  However, it also faces significant challenges to its 
effectiveness.  This section will examine the mechanism in light of the foregoing discussion.
The Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change establishes 
binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limits for industrialized countries.223   Beginning in 
2008, these parties will on average have to cap their GHG emissions at 5% below 1990 levels.  
Country-specific emissions caps are set out in Annex B to the Protocol.  The Kyoto Protocol also 
includes 4 market-based mechanisms, the EU Bubble, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint 
Implementation, and emissions trading.  Their function is to create flexibility and ease 
compliance with the emissions caps.224   Compliance with the caps is to be policed primarily 
through a non-compliance mechanism, as authorized by article 18.225
With the ratification of Russia, the Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005.  The 
mechanism was adopted at the first meeting of the parties in December 2005. 
A.  An Overview of the Non-Compliance Mechanism
The non-compliance mechanism will be administered by a 20-member Compliance 
Committee.  Its subcomponents are an enforcement branch, a facilitative branch, a bureau, and a 
plenary.226  One half of the members each serve in the enforcement branch and the facilitative 
220 Id. at 263-265, 
221
  The primary sanction available to classification societies is non-issuance of classifications.  The effect of the 
sanction is to make the ship ineligible to obtain insurance coverage, making it effectively impossible to operate.
222 See Ann Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Int'l Org. 41, 
74 (1993).
223
  37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), entered into force Feb.16, 2005; available at 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php>.
224 Id. at arts. 4, 6, 12, & 17.  See generallly Claire Breidenich et al., supra note ___, at 323-325.
225
  Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 24/CP.7, Annex II,  
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3, at 65 (Nov. 10, 2001), hereinafter Decision 24/CP.7.  Two additional means of 
addressing non-compliance are the multilateral consultative process of the Framework Convention and the dispute 
settlement provisions.  Kyoto Protocol, arts. 16, 19.  These two processes are to operate unaffected by the non-
compliance process.  Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 
24/CP.7, Annex II,  FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3, at 65, section XVI.
226
  Decision 24/CP.7, section II.
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branch.  Members for each branch are selected to reflect geographical regions and Annex I/non-
Annex I party status, including small island nations.  They all serve in their individual capacities, 
however.227  The bureau is made up of the respective chairs and vice-chairs of each branch.  Its 
primary responsibility is to allocate “questions of implementation,” i.e. potential non-compliance 
issues, between the two branches.228  The plenary is made up of all 20 members and handles all 
administrative and reporting matters.229
The facilitative branch, analogous to the Compliance Committee of the Montreal 
Protocol, is “responsible for providing advice and facilitation to Parties in implementing the 
Protocol, and for promoting compliance by Parties with their commitments under the 
Protocol.”230
In contrast, the enforcement branch is to address specific instances of non-compliance 
with the Annex B emissions caps, the methodological and reporting requirements, and the 
eligibility requirements of the Clean Development mechanism (article 6), Joint Implementation 
(article 12), and emissions trading (article 17).231 It is also responsible for applying the 
“consequences” of non-compliance.  The branch’s decisions are to be adopted by consensus.  If 
consensus cannot be reached, the decision must be supported by a three-fourths majority, 
including simple majorities each of Annex I and of non-Annex I countries.232
Questions of implementation may be brought to the attention of the Compliance 
Committee by reports of the expert review teams, a party with respect to itself, and other parties 
when supported by corroborating evidence.233  After allocation of a question of implementation 
to the responsible branch, the branch engages in a preliminary examination of the matter to 
ensure that it is “supported by sufficient information,” is “not de minimis or ill-founded,” and is 
“based on the requirements of the Protocol.”234
If a decision to proceed is made, each branch may base its decisions on a broad range of 
relevant information, including expert advice.235  In an enforcement branch proceeding, the party 
whose implementation is at issue may request a hearing.236  Before a final decision is made, the 
branch must issue a preliminary finding or decision not to proceed.  The party concerned may 
provide additional written comments to any preliminary finding.237   Both the preliminary and 
final decisions must be supported by conclusions and reasons therefor and are to be provided to 
the other parties and the public.238  With respect to eligibility requirements under the articles 6, 
12, and 17 Kyoto mechanisms, an expedited procedure is applied by the enforcement branch.239
227
  Decision 24/CP.7, section II(6), IV(1), & V(1).
228
  Decision 24/CP.7, section VII(1).
229
  Decision 24/CP.7, section III.
230
  Decision 24/CP.7, section IV(4).
231
  Decision 24/CP.7, section V(4).
232
  Decision 24/CP.7, section II(9).  Annex I to the UN Framework Convention includes the industrialized countries
included in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B plus Turkey.
233
  Decision 24/CP.7, section VI(1); Kyoto Protocol, art. 8(3).
234
  Decision 24/CP.7, section VII(2).
235
  Decision 24/CP.7, section VIII(3)-(5).
236
  Decision 24/CP.7, section IX(2).
237
  Decision 24/CP.7, section IX(4)-(10).
238
  Decision 24/CP.7, section IX(5),(6), & (9).
239
  Decision 24/CP.7, section X.
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Enforcement branch decisions relating to compliance with a party’s Annex B emissions 
caps may be appealed by a party to the full set of Kyoto Protocol parties if the party “believes it 
has been denied due process.”240  If no appeal is taken, the enforcement branch’s decision 
becomes “definitive” after 45 days.
The consequences of non-compliance are “aimed at the restoration of compliance to 
ensure environmental integrity, and . . .  to provide for an incentive to comply.”241  Remedies 
applied by the facilitative branch will provide assistance and aid to bring the party concerned 
back into compliance.242  In contrast, the consequences applied by the enforcement branch are 
designed to be more coercive and are automatically applicable.243  With respect to 
methodological and reporting requirements, the enforcement branch is to issue a non-compliance 
declaration and develop a plan for remedying the problem.244  When eligibility for the article 6, 
12, and 17 Kyoto mechanisms is at issue, suspension of eligibility is the consequence.245  With 
respect to non-compliance with Annex B emissions limits, the consequence is 
(a) Deduction from the Party’s assigned amount for the second commitment 
period of a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times the amount in tonnes of excess 
emissions;
(b) Development of a compliance action plan . . . ; and
(c) Suspension of the eligibility to make transfers under Article 17 [emissions
trading] . . . until the Party is reinstated in accordance with section X.246
The non-compliance mechanism explicitly provides that for subsequent commitment periods, the 
rate of deduction for excess emissions is to be determined by amendment.247
B.  A Critique
Even in advance of its official approval and prior to its actual application, the non-
compliance mechanism has already been hailed as “the most robust”248 and “"the most 
innovative and elaborate non-compliance procedure for any existing multilateral environmental 
agreement.”249  Many of its features are unquestionably novel and innovative for an 
240
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XI(1).
241
  Decision 24/CP.7, section V(6).
242
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XIV.
243
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XV.
244
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XV(1)-(3).
245
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XV(4).
246
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XV(5).  Emissions trading eligibility can be reinstated if the compliance plan 
demonstrates that the party concerned will be able to meet its emissions limit in the next commitment period.  Id.
section X(3), (4).
247
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XV(8).
248
  Glenn Wiser, Analysis & Perspective: Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch, Int. Env. Reporter 
Current Report, vol 25, no. 2, pg. 91 (Jan. 16, 2002).  See also Matthew Vespa, Annual Review of Environment and 
Natural Resources Law: Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 395, 413 (2002).
249
  12 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 189, at 15 (2001), available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb12189e.pdf.
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environmental treaty.  They make unique contributions toward the goals of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Yet, questions about the non-compliance mechanism’s overall effectiveness remain.
1.  Strategic Behavior
One of the most important accomplishments is to institutionalize the process of 
enforcement in a neutral and independent body.  The creation of an enforcement branch reduces 
the cost to any individual party of initiating an enforcement action.  Even though individual 
parties or an expert review team will need to trigger the process, the enforcement branch will 
bear the cost of pursuing these issues.  
Furthermore, the structure of the branch will reduce the likelihood that political 
manipulation and expediency will be a significant factor in its decisions.  Members of the branch 
will serve in an independent capacity.  The membership of the enforcement branch explicitly 
anticipates inclusion of an individual from the small island nations, a set of nations whose stakes 
in the effective operation of the Protocol is greatest.  Non-compliance penalties are applied 
automatically and are mostly pre-detemined.  NGOs may provide input into the process.  And 
information that is submitted and the branch’s determination are made available to the public, 
thus increasing transparency.250  One commentator has gone as far as to describe it as functioning 
“much like a court.”251  In short, the incentive to forego enforcement for the sake of  political 
expediency will be small.  
The significant and fixed size of the Annex B non-compliance sanction, 30% of excess 
emissions, will also give the process a significant punitive and coercive element.252  It will create 
a greater incentive to trigger enforcement actions since the sanction will be more certain and 
coercive, and hence more effective.  Compliance will hopefully be the preferred response.  
The biggest question that remains, however, is whether the penalties will be sufficient to 
alter the incentives for strategic behavior so that enforcement initiation becomes attractive 
enough.  Financial penalties, though proposed, were not incorporated.  Reinstatement of 
emission trading eligibility appears relatively easy.  Even the 30% excess emissions penalty is 
likely to have only limited effect since Article 18 stipulates that any procedures entailing binding 
consequences are subject to adoption by the amendment process.  Refusal to ratify such an 
amendment or even to participate in the subsequent commitment period could open a back-door 
escape from penalties.   
Delay of penalty application until the following commitment period poses two additional 
problems.  First, since each party’s greenhouse gas emissions reductions for the subsequent 
commitment period have not been determined, the severity of the penalties can be blunted by 
manipulation of the assigned amounts. Second, given the 5-year length of the commitment 
period, delay may also blunt political accountability of government officials responsible for non-
250
  Decision 24/CP.7, section VIII(4) & (6).
251
  Glenn Wiser, Analysis & Perspective: Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch,supra note ___ at  86.  
A more appropriate characterization may be an administrative tribunal since the enforcement officer and the 
adjudicator are ultimately controlled, albeit only to a limited extent, by the same superior officials, the Meeting of 
the Parties.
252
  In addition to simple deterrence, the penalty may be viewed as a type of liquidated damage that addresses 
difficult-to-measure costs of non-compliance.  
3/14/2006 International Environmental Treaty Enforcement
41
compliance.  Willful ignorance or acceptance of non-compliance may be a possibility.
The most significant threat to systematic application of the enforcement process, 
however, remains manipulation via implicit or explicit threats of treaty denunciation.  If 
denunciation by a party is perceived as potentially causing significant disruptions, even the 
independence of the enforcement branch might not protect against a determination that non-
enforcement would ultimately be in the best interest of the institution.
2.  The Second Order Collective Action
The form of the sanctions help to overcome some of the second order collective action 
problem.  Suspension of the right to engage in emissions trading and the 30% penalty take 
advantage of processes that exist already within the Kyoto Protocol’s administrative structure.  
There will be little need to marshal new cooperative efforts or resources of other parties for 
implementation.  Instead, emissions accounting and trading processes are adjusted to reflect 
additional emissions reduction obligations or ineligibility to trade.
Unfortunately again, the sanctions themselves do not become binding until the Kyoto 
Protocol is amended and ratified and will not apply until the subsequent commitment period.  
The trading suspension appears to be easily reversible.  The longer the parties wait to proceed 
with the amendment and ratification process, the more likely it is that some parties will know in 
advance the cost of compliance.  Such parties may come to see opposition to amendment of the 
Protocol as within their best interest.
3.  Norms and the Rule of Law
The non-compliance mechanism incorporates a number of features to promote treaty 
norms and the rule of law.  The explicit requirement that any implementation question be 
supported by sufficient evidence, “not . . . ill-founded,” and “based on the requirements of the 
Protocol,”253 will ensure that the enforcement mechanism adhere closely to the treaty’s 
substantive goals and values.  Removal of de minimis violations by the preliminary examination 
also eliminates nuisance actions and abuses of the enforcement process for harassment purposes.  
Misuse of the non-compliance mechanism is thus minimized.  
The duty to comply is reinforced by the automatic application of punitive consequences 
upon a non-compliance finding and by limiting appeals to due process issues.  At the same time, 
legitimacy and fairness of the enforcement action are promoted by explicit reference to due 
process254 and the requirement that decisions be supported by conclusions and reasons.255  The 
overall effect is to increase the transparency of the enforcement process and reduce the risk of 
arbitrary or politically motivated decisions.
However, implementation of treaty norms is also potentially undermined by opportunities 
to manipulate or avoid their application.  Sanctions do not become binding until the Kyoto 
Protocol is amended.  Sanctions are also delayed in their application until the following 
253
  Decision 24/CP.7, section VIII(7)(2).
254
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XI(1).
255
  Decision 24/CP.7, section IX(5) & (9).
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commitment period.  
There also has been no elaboration of the meaning of the de minimis threshold or the 
content of the due process requirement.  Does de minimis designate an absolute quantity or a 
percentage fraction?  If a percentage basis is chosen, is the comparison standard the party’s total 
assigned amount emissions or only the emissions reductions (or increases) inscribed in Annex B?  
The answer to these questions could have significant consequences on whether overall emissions 
targets are met and the credibility of treaty norms.  Even if developing countries are put aside for 
the time being, the greenhouse gas emissions even between individual Annex B members, such 
as the U.S. and Monaco, can vary by several orders of magnitude.  A fixed amount threshold that 
is reasonable for Monaco will be meaningless to the U.S., because of its likely minuscule nature.  
On the other hand, a fixed amount threshold that is meaningful for the U.S. may swallow up all 
of Monaco’s assigned amount. 
The lack of elaboration of the due process requirement poses even greater problems.  Due 
process can mean not only fair procedures but also substantive legal rights and defenses.  That 
may include substantive principles of state responsibility, especially excuses such as 
impossibility.  Given their previous lack of elaboration, however, full application is likely to 
upset expectations about the actual strictness of Protocol requirements and the true likely 
consequences of non-compliance.  There has also been no guidance on how threats of 
denunciation are to be dealt with in a principled and equitable fashion. 
Finally, there has been no elaboration of how special circumstances or other conditions, 
for example when the violation is minor but not de minimis, could justify a variance from the 
pre-specified 30% sanctions.  The mandatory nature of the penalty provisions seem to deny that 
possibility.  Simply abolition of discretion in the penalty assessment process, however, does not 
eliminate its operation in the process.  As the federal experience with criminal sentencing 
guidelines indicates, it simply moves elsewhere.  The question is not whether the legal process 
will accommodate the need for fairness in the imposition of sanctions but rather how.  The 
appropriate application of enforcement discretion as a way of accommodating concerns about 
fairness, justice, or effective use of enforcement resources remains an unresolved problem. 
Ultimately, the non-compliance process has not adequately articulated how non-
enforcement may be the legitimate and proper result of discretionary judgments and legal excuse 
doctrines.  Even though strengthening of sanctions processes is much needed, fairness 
considerations cannot be ignored.  As legal norms, treaty provisions are not only authoritative 
within their respective scope but also limited by other doctrines and equitable considerations in 
their actual application.  
There is at least one other significant issue.  Only the enforcement target is granted the 
right to appeal an adverse decision of the Compliance Committee.256  The result is to make it 
impossible to correct  misapplications of treaty norms if they result in non-enforcement.  While 
the use of a criminal due process model is favorable to the enforcement target, its 
appropriateness here seems dubious. 
C.  The Underlying Problem of Treaty Design
256
  Decision 24/CP.7, section XI(1).
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The Kyoto Protocol’s non-compliance mechanism represents a great step forward.  There 
are, however, further underlying problems of treaty design that will impede the effectiveness of 
the sanctions process and the actual accomplishment of Protocol goals. 
The climate change treaties have been modeled on the framework convention-protocol 
design of the ozone treaties.257  Like the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol’s primary 
regulatory approach is to limit the atmospheric emissions by binding numerical targets, the 
Annex B assigned amounts.258  In doing so, however, the Kyoto Protocol chose to ignore critical 
differences.
Traditionally, ozone depleting substances production was dominated by a concentrated 
industry with only a handful of significant manufacturers.  The Montreal Protocol phase-out 
schedules for the production of ozone depleting substances259 was transparent and unambiguous 
in its signals to the industry: phase out production!  Little was required to operationalize its 
requirements. 
Unfortunately, even though the Protocol’s Annex B limitations seem as deceptively 
simple and clear as the Montreal Protocol phase-out targets, the nature of the Annex B 
limitations is different.  Unlike true emissions limitations of the type applied to particular 
industrial polluters,260 regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is in essence an attempt to control 
the many-fold uses of fossil fuel.  That means power plants, the gamut of industrial users of oil 
products, individuals using personal vehicles or heating their homes, as well as the entire public 
transportation industry – in short, the activities of a country’s entire economy.  The emissions 
limits thus require parties to restrict energy use, change transportation policies, and address land 
use changes.  It will require large scale changes of national economies and life-styles and force 
governments to make complex choices and decisions about implementation.261  Like many other 
environmental agreements, the Kyoto Protocol creates a mandate to regulate, with all its 
attendant difficulties.
To facilitate enforcement, the regulatory regime will need to focus more specifically on 
industries or particular activities that contribute to GHG emissions.  Continued insistence on 
whole-sale and generic regulatory mandates will continue to present difficulties to their 
enforcement.
Conclusion
257 See, e.g., RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 320-330; DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING x-xi (2001); Developments in the Law: International 
Environmental Law, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1484, 1542 (1991).  See also Birnie & Boyle, supra note ___, at 10.
258 See Kyoto Protocol art. 3(1) & (7), Annex B.  
259
  The Montreal Protocol limits both production and consumption of ozone depleting substances (ODS).  However, 
consumption is calculated by adding production plus imports minus exports.  Consumption of ODS is thus directly 
correlated to production of ODS.  See Montreal Protocol art. 3.
260
  The problem of the Kyoto Protocol closely resembles the problem of regulatory implementation of the hazardous 
air pollutants provisions of the Clean Air Act in the 1970s and 1980s.  See generally John Dwyer, The Pathology of 
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 233 (1990).
261 See generally DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW 
GLOBAL WARMING (2001).
3/14/2006 International Environmental Treaty Enforcement
44
The systematic triggering of institutional deterrent sanctions in response to environmental 
treaty breaches remains a difficult problem.  The turn to alternatives in contemporary 
international law practice has circumvented some of the difficulties.  But these approaches have 
their own draw-backs.  And each by itself is unable to duplicate the instrumental and normative 
functions of enforcement.  
Understanding the public good characteristics of enforcement explains many of the 
difficulties of enforcement.  More importantly, it also suggests constructive approaches to 
improving the enforcement of environmental agreements.  None of the possible avenues is likely 
to be easy to follow.  But they offer options that do not require one to give up on institutional 
deterrent sanctions.  For those committed to a strong rule of law, these options also present the 
possibility that enforcement can make a greater contribution toward the development and 
maturation of international environmental law.
